Kartago tydens die Puniese oorloë

Kartago tydens die Puniese oorloë


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Kon Kartago die Puniese oorloë gewen het?

Soos die titel. Was daar gebeurtenisse wat in Kartago se guns sou kon verander, of was dit bloot van die begin af gedoem? Waarom was Kartago en Rome so anders en waarom is bewys dat Rome magtiger as Kartago was?

Edit: Dit is die eerste keer dat ek op reddit plaas, en ek wil regtig hê jy moet weet wat julle hiervan dink :)

As u 'n weddery in die 3de eeu vC was, sou die slim geld op Kartago gewees het. Hulle spog met die grootste vloot in die Wes -Middellandse See. Rome was byna uitsluitlik 'n landmoondheid. Kartago was ryker. Sy kon bekostig om massiewe huursoldate te huur en te behou. Aangesien die oorlogsteater (ten minste in die 1ste Puniese Oorlog) Sicilië, Sardinië/Korsika en die seestraat was, het hierdie voordele waarskynlik onoorkomelik gelyk.

Hoe het die Romeine dit reggekry om die massiewe vloot van Kartago aan te pas en te oorkom? Het hulle net besluit: "Kom ons bou net meer skepe"? En het u na u mening gedink dat hierdie oorlog Rome as 'n opperste mag in die Middellandse See bepaal?

'N Interessante oorweging is dus om na te dink oor die slag van Cannae.

Alhoewel die Romeine die slag van Cannae met ontsaglike hoeveelhede slagoffers verloor het, kon hulle steeds herstel. Die verlies by Cannae toon dus nie net die glans van Hannibal nie, maar ook die duursaamheid van die Romeinse Ryk.

Vra jouself af hoeveel ryke op 'n dag ongeveer 60.000 soldate kan verloor en steeds vyandelikhede kan voortsit.

En Cannae was die derde geveg in 'n ry waar die Romeine basies die hele leër verloor het (hoewel Cannae die grootste was). En tog het hulle aangehou.

Hierdie getal is vergelykbaar met die aantal vermoorde/beseerde Duitse soldate in Stalingrad (ongeveer 300.000). Hulle kon nie herstel nie, Rome kon.

Ek het net die vorige opmerkings afgetrek: ek dink inderdaad dat Kartago die beste skoot in die 1ste Puniese Oorlog gehad het. Hadsdrubl het 'n meesterlike guerrilla -oorlog in Sicilië gevoer en in daardie tyd was die seevoordeel van Kartago absoluut. As die Kartagiese senaat Hadsdrubl behoorlike versterking gegee het en die oorlog eintlik ernstig vervolg het ná die terugslae wat dit gely het, kon dit heel anders gewees het.

Die grootste bate van Rome op daardie tydstip was die vermoë om ''n slag te slaan'. O, ek het 12 legioene verloor, daar is meer waar dit vandaan kom. Hulle het destyds 'n bevolkings- en veerkragtigheidsvoordeel bo Kartago gehad en tydens die 2de en 3de oorloë, ook 'n geldvoordeel. Die heersers van Rome het ook 'n aandeel in militêre oorwinning gehad vir hul eie politieke vooruitgang/kulturele trots op 'n manier wat die heersers van Kartago nie gedoen het nie.

'N Interessante opmerking wat vir my bloot 'n mening is, maar 'n groot rede waarom Rome 'n knou kan kry, is dat hulle so hoogs ambisieus was. As een konsul of generaal misluk, was daar altyd nog 'n charismatiese leier wat net WEET dat hy beter kan doen. En het dit dikwels gedoen

Nee, Carthago het nie 'n sosiale organisasie gehad nie Romeinse volharding.

Dit sou miskien te danke aan haar hulpbronne/middele dit teoreties kon afbreek, haar kaarte was nog nie sleg nie en soms het dit selfs beter gelyk (dink First Punic Wat). Maar eerlikwaar, diegene wat dit voorgee, speel 'n vereenvoudigde getalspel in die geskiedenis wat eenvoudig nie die subtieler ingewikkeldhede van wat gebeur het begryp nie. Die skraal argument dat Hannibal Rome kon aangeneem het, het min aanvoeling en is 'n sirkelargument wat nie 'n beroep op beide oortuigings of ontevredenheid ontbreek nie. As Hannibal 'n Romein was, sou hy die Med. As Scipio 'n Kartagoër was, het hy self in Bithynia beland.

Aan die einde van die dag was die Kartago -sosiopolitieke raamwerk nie dieselfde as dié van Rome nie. Duisend Hannibals of Scipios kon dit nie verander het nie.

Aan die einde van die dag was die Kartago -sosiopolitieke raamwerk nie dieselfde as dié van Rome nie. Duisend Hannibals of Scipios kon dit nie verander het nie.

Nee, Carthago het nie 'n sosiale organisasie gehad wat die Romeinse volharding ondermyn het nie.

Aan die einde van die dag was die Kartago -sosiopolitieke raamwerk nie dieselfde as dié van Rome nie. Duisend Hannibals of Scipios kon dit nie verander het nie.

Hoeveel weet ons van die sosiopolitieke struktuur van Kartago wat nie uit Romeinse bronne kom nie?

Suiwer gemors. Geen aanstoot nie, maar daar was geen 'sociopolitical ' eienskappe wat die Kartago -oorwinning verhinder het nie.

Niks word ooit in klip gesteek nie. Daar was baie kanse tydens die Puniese oorloë vir Kartago om die dag aan te gryp. As Philip suksesvol met Hannibal geskakel het nadat hy die Aetoliërs in die wiele gery het, as die Hanno -faksie nie so 'n houvas in die Raad van Oudstes gehad het om die versterking van Hannibal te voorkom nie, as Hannibal na Cannae reguit sou optrek of met Hasdrubal sou skakel.

U punt oor Romeinse vasberadenheid is korrek, maar dit beteken geensins dat die Kartago -oorwinning eenvoudig nie behaal kon word nie. Die hele verhaal van die Puniese Oorlog is dat Rome nog nooit so naby aan 'n nederlaag gedruk is nie; dit lyk asof u dit verstaan ​​met u tweede paragraaf, daarom is dit kommerwekkend om te sien dat u so 'n swart-en-wit definitiewe reaksie soos 'no & #x27 punt leeg.

Nie die derde Puniese oorlog nie. Die een was net bedoel, dit was Rome wat besluit het om Kartago vir ewig te verpletter, net uit wrok uit die eerste twee oorloë.

Kartago sou in die eerste of tweede strafoorloë kon wen as sy edele en welgestelde gesinne meer in die oorlog gepoog het, en as dit nie so sterk op huursoldate sou staatmaak nie. Uiteindelik was Rome egter baie meer bereid om deel te neem aan die totale oorlog. Rome was ook baie beter in die aanpassing en leer, en het beter geword in die gevegte soos dit aangegaan het, terwyl Kartago dit nie gedoen het nie (soos dat die Romeine hul vlootvaardighede verbeter het en die Corvus uitgevind het om hulle te help om aan boord van ander vaartuie in vlootgevegte te gaan).

Sou Carthago meer kon inspan in die oorlogspoging en die vloot daarvan verbeter het? Teoreties, seker. Kon hulle 'n paar ekstra gevegte op die land gewen het met 'n beter taktiek? Teoreties, seker.

Kon hulle in die 2de Puniese Oorlog gewen het? ja, as Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus nie daar was om sy strategieë te implementeer nie, of as Hannibal daarin geslaag het om meer bondgenote in Italië te kry.


2 Antwoorde 2

Tydens die Puniese oorloë het die Masedoniërs hulself met die Kartagoërs verbonde met die verwagting dat hulle die oorwinnaars van die oorlog sou wees en daarom in die toekoms met hulle in goeie verhouding sou wees. Om dit te bevestig, is die Masedonies -Kartago -verdrag in 215 vC onderteken, soos opgeteken deur Livy.

Tydens hierdie wedstryd, tussen die twee magtigste mense ter wêreld, het alle konings en nasies hul aandag gevestig. 2 Onder hulle het Filippus, die koning van die Masedoniërs, dit met groter angstigheid beskou, net soos hy nader aan Italië was, en omdat hy slegs deur die Ioniese See daarvan geskei was. [3] Toe hy die eerste keer hoor dat Hannibal die Alpe oorgesteek het, was hy verheug dat daar 'n oorlog tussen die Romeine en die Kartagoërs ontstaan ​​het, maar hoewel hulle krag nog nie vasgestel was nie, het hy twyfelagtig gevoel wat hy eerder sou wou hê [p. 876] seëvier. [4] Maar nadat die derde geveg gevoer is en die derde oorwinning aan die kant van die Kartagoërs was, het hy geneig om fortuin te maak en ambassadeurs na Hannibal gestuur. Livy 23.33

Met die alliansie in plek, sou die Romeine hul magte en hulpbronne verder na die ooste moes strek om enige moontlike Masedoniese offensief teë te werk.

Die Masedoniërs het talle dinge om te wen uit die nederlaag van Rome:

Dit sou Romeinse uitbreidingspogings na Illyria beperk, wat voor die Puniese oorloë plaasgevind het en die grense van Masedon bedreig het

dit sou keer dat die Romeinse geld in die onafhanklike Griekse Poleis kom wat gebruik is om opposisie teen die Masedoniese konings te bevorder en hul militêre oppergesag in Griekeland te verswak.

En verder het die verdrag verseker dat die hele Carthaginiërs sou help dat Macedon haar vyande in die ooste sou onderdruk as die hele Italië onder die Carthaagse heerskappy was:

Dat, toe Italië heeltemal bedwing was, hulle Griekeland sou vaar en oorlog sou voer met die nasies wat die koning wou. Dat die stede op die vasteland en die eilande wat grens aan Masedonië behoort aan Philip en sy heerskappy. ”

Die uitvoering van 'n Masedonies-Kartago-alliansie is sterk bevorder deur die hofraadslid Demetrius van Pharos, wat die laaste heerser van Illyria was voordat die Romeine hom in 229 vC verslaan het. Demetrius het volgens Polybius groot invloed op die Masedoniese koning gehad en het hom aangespoor om Illyria binne te val om hom weer te vestig sedert die Kartagoë verslaan is.

Daar is aangeteken dat Demetrius vir Philip V sê:

Want Griekeland is u reeds heeltemal gehoorsaam, en dit sal dit bly: die Achaeërs uit opregte liefde die Aetoliërs van die terreur wat hul rampe in die huidige oorlog hulle geïnspireer het. Italië, en u daardeur, is die eerste stap in die verkryging van 'n universele ryk, waarop niemand 'n beter aanspraak het as u nie. En dit is nou die tyd om op te tree wanneer die Romeine die omgekeerde ondergaan het. Polybius, 5.101

Dit was dus die bedreiging van Demetrius en Phillip vir die Romeinse besette Illyria en ook vir Italië self wat die Romeine aangespoor het om militêr in te gryp.


Inhoud

Antieke Kartago (814–146 v.C.)

Die Punies, Kartagoërs of Wes -Fenisiërs was 'n groep mense in die Wes -Middellandse See wat hul oorsprong na die Fenisiërs herlei het. Antieke Kartago, wat omstreeks 814 vC gestig is as 'n kolonie Tirus deur die legendariese koningin Dido, was een van die rykste en magtigste stede in die oudheid en die middelpunt van 'n groot kommersiële en maritieme ryk wat tot in die middel van die derde eeu vC die westelike Middellandse See oorheers het. . Teen 300 vC strek die nou onafhanklike Kartago -ryk oor 'n lapwerk van kolonies, vasale en satellietstate wat meer grondgebied as enige ander staat in die streek uitmaak. Die rykdom en mag van Carthago berus hoofsaaklik op die strategiese ligging wat toegang tot oorvloedige vrugbare grond en belangrike handelsroetes bied. Sy uitgebreide handelsnetwerk, wat tot in Wes -Afrika en Noord -Europa uitgebrei het, het 'n verskeidenheid handelsware van regoor die antieke wêreld voorsien, sowel as winsgewende uitvoer van landbougoedere en vervaardigde produkte. Hierdie kommersiële ryk is beveilig deur een van die grootste en magtigste vloot in die antieke Middellandse See, en 'n leër wat grootliks uit buitelandse huursoldate en hulpverleners bestaan ​​het.

As die dominante mag van die westelike Middellandse See, het Kartago onvermydelik in botsing gekom met baie bure en mededingers, van die inheemse Berbers van Noord -Afrika tot die ontluikende Romeinse Republiek. Na eeue se konflik met die Siciliaanse Grieke, het sy groeiende mededinging met Rome uitgeloop op die Puniese oorloë (264–146 v.C.), wat sommige van die grootste en mees gesofistikeerde gevegte in die oudheid beleef het, en amper gelei het tot die vernietiging van Rome. In 146 vC, na die derde en laaste Puniese Oorlog, verwoes die Romeine Kartago en vestig later 'n nuwe stad in die plek daarvan. Alle oorblyfsels van die Kartago -beskawing het teen die eerste eeu nC onder die Romeinse heerskappy gekom.

Ondanks die kosmopolitiese karakter van sy ryk, het Kartago se kultuur en identiteit vasberade gebly Fenisies, of Punies. Net soos ander Fenisiese mense, was die samelewing sterk verstedelik en georiënteerd op seevaart en handel, deels weerspieël deur die meer bekende innovasies en tegniese prestasies, waaronder seriële produksie, ongekleurde glas, die dorsplank en die katoen. Die Kartagoërs het hul onderskeidings gemaak vir hul kommersiële ambisies en unieke regeringstelsel, wat elemente van demokrasie, oligargie en republikanisme gekombineer het, insluitend moderne voorbeelde van kontrole en saldo's.

Romeinse Kartago (146 v.C. – 700)

Na die vernietiging van Puniese Kartago, 'n nuwe stad Kartago (Latyn Carthāgō) is in die middel van die 1ste eeu vC op dieselfde grond gebou. Teen die 3de eeu het Kartago ontwikkel tot een van die grootste stede van die Romeinse Ryk, met 'n bevolking van honderdduisende. Dit was die middelpunt van die Romeinse provinsie Afrika, wat 'n belangrike broodmandjie van die ryk was. Kartago word kortliks die hoofstad van 'n usurpator, Domitius Alexander, in 308–311. In 439 deur die Vandale verower, dien Kartago 'n eeu lank as die hoofstad van die Vandaalryk. Dit is tussen 533 en 534 herower deur die Oos -Romeinse Ryk (later bekend as die Bisantynse Ryk), en het voortgegaan om as 'n Oos -Romeinse streeksentrum te dien, as die setel van die praetoriaanse prefektuur van Afrika (na 590 die eksargaat van Afrika).

Onafhanklike Kartago (700–1378)

Aan die einde van die 6de eeu het die Kartago -provinsie in opstand gekom teen die Oos -Romeinse Ryk, met die begin van die Kartago -onafhanklikheidsoorlog (689–700). Die veldtog was suksesvol, en Kartago het op 1 Januarie 700 nC sy onafhanklikheid verkry. Die nuwe staat is na die antieke Kartago geskoei en het baie simbole en gebruike van die tydperk aangeneem. Sy regering was baie soortgelyk aan die Puniese regering, waarin die senaat van Kartago die meeste van die tyd regeer het, en 'n diktator in beheer was tydens staatsgevalle of ander ernstige situasies.

Eerste diktatorskap (1378–1410)

Die regering het dieselfde gebly tot 1378, toe 'n groep senatore 'n diktator vir lewenslange lewe geïnstalleer het, soortgelyk aan Julius Caesar. Himlico die diktator regeer Kartago met 'n ystervuis van 1378 tot 1407, toe hy vermoor is deur dieselfde senatore wat hom geïnstalleer het. Baie Kartagoërs beskou hierdie bloedige gebeurtenis as 'n déjà vu, om die minste te sê.

Hanno -dinastie (1410–1849)

Na die dood van Himlico die Diktator, het 'n groot magvakuum oorgeneem. Sommige mense het geglo dat die seun van die ontslape diktator sy posisie moet erf, terwyl ander meen dat die senaat herstel moet word. 'N Kort burgeroorlog het plaasgevind, die Eerste Kartagoense Burgeroorlog, wat daartoe gelei het dat Hanno, die neef van die ontslape diktator, die pos geërf het.

Hanno regeer minder as drie jaar as diktator voordat hy homself tot keiser van Kartago verklaar het. Hy was 'n sterk nasionalis en het Egipte aangeval. Egipte het wraak geneem, om die hoofstad van Kartago omring en die keiser gedwing om oor te gee. Geringe grenslande is aan Egipte afgestaan, Hanno het homself van keiser tot koning afgegee en moes die Senaat uitnooi om saam met hom te regeer.

Van 1410 tot 1849 regeer die Huis Hanno oor die koninkryk van Kartago. Gedurende hierdie jare het handel oopgegaan en diplomatieke betrekkinge begin met buurlande, soos Frankryk, Spanje en Egipte. Dit was ook gedurende hierdie tyd dat die Kartago -industriële stelsel gegroei het. Oorlog was vreemd vir die land, en die Kartagoërs was meestal in vrede.

Tweede diktatuur (1849–1960)

In 1849 sterf koning Hasdrubal VI sonder erfgenaam. Die mense, wat nasionalisties geword het, het die senaat oorgeneem en 'n militêre diktatuur gestig. Die nuwe regering het buitelandse betrekkinge gesluit en die lewens van baie Carthaagse burgers vernietig.

Demokratiese republiek (sedert 1960)

Op 12 Maart 1960 het 'n paar teleurgestelde regstudente die Demokratiese Party gestig om die People's Party, wat 'n beroemde marionetteparty van die diktator was, teë te staan. Nadat 'n studente -rebellie wreed neergelê is, het 'n skelm lyfwag homself en die gesin van die diktator opgevlam. Binnekort is daar verkiesings gehou met die Demokrate wat die Eerste Minister geword het en president, hulle het hierdie posisies beklee tot 1972. Die rolprentbedryf het geslaan met treffers soos Zorba die Griek (gebaseer op die boek), Dokter Zhivago (Romantiese epos) en Raai wie kom aandete toe (familiekomedie).

'N Dekade na die Demokratiese Party kom die Republikeinse Party uit 'n klein dorpie. Hulle het die presidentskap en die premierskap vir vier jaar geneem voordat hulle die presidentskap verloor het. Gedurende hierdie tyd het die rolprentbedryf gaan lê en het hulle baie gefokus op Europese diplomasie. Eind 1989 kom 'n derde party in die vorm van die Moderate. Dit het die groot burgemeestersverkiesings meegesleur en die ander partye senuweeagtig gemaak oor die algemene verkiesing van 1991. Dit was omstreeks hierdie tyd dat die Kommunistiese Party gesterf het nadat hy laas in 1967 die burgemeester van Tunis aangehou het. Hierdie era word gesien as die Carthaagse blom.

Na 'n vroeë begin met die groot burgemeestersverkiesings, het die Moderate die premierskap gevee. Aangesien hul beleid minimale ekonomiese inmenging is, het die ekonomie twee jaar floreer totdat Italië die grootste toeristeplek geword het. Sonder 'n rugsteunbedryf het die ekonomie in duie gestort en eers in 2002 herstel. 'N Amerikaanse sakeman het die meeste ondernemings kon koop, en sy vriende het die land 'n rukkie lank bestuur tot sy sluipmoord in 1993. Tydens die kroning van koning Manuel IV van Portugal, het die premier Minister is vermoor en die Kartagoërs het tevergeefs geëis. 'N Handelsblokkade begin en duur 'n jaar totdat die Amerikaanse president, Gary Hart, 'n ooreenkoms bereik het wat hom 'n Nobelprys vir vrede gee. Dit was 'n donker tyd vir Kartago, aangesien die ekonomie wat blykbaar staalvry was, in duie gestort het.

Na die 1980's het Carthago gefokus op die heropbou van sy ekonomie. Gedurende hierdie tyd is die Amerikaanse sakeman vermoor en het sy vriende uit die mag geval. Die Republikeinse party het steun gekry namate die gewildheid van die Moderate daarna neergestort het. Die regering het baie goeie betrekkinge met Italië aangegaan, en hierdie keer het kulturele heropwekking ontstaan ​​met 'n Oscar-bekroonde film. Malta was die eerste wat 'n ekonomies stabiele provinsie Kartago geword het. Judaïsme was meer teenwoordig in die generasie van daardie dekade. Mense het die volgende millennium ingegaan met ekonomiese, kulturele en politieke hoop daarvoor.


Tweede Puniese Oorlog — Vroeë gevegte: 218 tot 216 v.C.

"WORD ONS GESLAAN, O R OMANS, IN 'N GROOT GEveg, is ons leër vernietig."
Die Tweede Puniese Oorlog, van die eerste tot die laaste, is gedryf deur een man, Hannibal Barca. Kort nadat hy die bevel van sy vaders se leër in Spanje verkry het, het Hannibal begin beplan vir 'n inval in Italië deur die Alpe oor te steek. Sy plan was om homself te verbind met die Galliërs en ander vyande van Rome in die noorde en dan op Rome self af te daal. Die regering van Kartago het hierdie planne nie gesteun nie en toe hy die oorlog begin deur die Saguntum, 'n Romeinse bondgenoot in Spanje, aan te val, beveel hulle hom om op te hou. Hy vermy die ambassadeur en gaan voort met sy bedrywighede totdat Rome oorlog aan Kartago verklaar, en dan kry hy verlof om Kartago se belange te verdedig. Hy het dit gedoen deur 'n groot leër op te rig en vinnig agtereenvolgens die Ebro, die Pireneë, die Rhône en uiteindelik die Alpe oor te steek. Die verhaal van sy opmars is 'n avontuur op sigself, maar kort nadat hy Italiaanse grond bereik het, het hy sy eerste stryd teen Rome gevoer, nadat hy 'n verkenningsmag onder leiding van 'n ouer Scipio by Ticinusrivier ontmoet het. Dit is gevolg deur 'n veel groter en meer rampspoedige betrokkenheid by Trebia. Hannibal het, soos sy gewoonte was, 'n hinderlaag neergelê en wed op die onwrikbaarheid van die Romeinse generaal, die Romeinse leër met 'n geweldige verlies gered. Daarna het hy die winter in Galliese gebied deurgebring, sy troepe laat rus en sy volgende stap beplan.

Rome was in oproer oor hierdie ellendige wending. Polities was dit verdeel tussen 'n 'versigtige' faksie, geïllustreer deur Scipio, en 'n 'dringende' faksie, geïllustreer deur Sempronious, die konsul wat sy leër in die strik van Hannibal by Trebia gehardloop het. Die Romeinse gewoonte om twee konsuls te kies, een uit elke faksie, het in hierdie geval rampspoedig gewerk, aangesien Hannibal maklik kon onderskei watter konsul hy in 'n strik sou lok. In die geval van die Trasimene -meer was Flaminius die stokperdjie, en die koste was 30 000 mans wat doodgemaak of gevang is tot Hannibal se verlies van 1 500. Op hierdie stadium het Rome Fabius aangestel as diktator van die 'versigtige' oorreding en daardeur 'n jaar lank verwoesting gekry van verwoestende aanvalle, en kon hy die meeste van hul Italiaanse bondgenote bymekaar hou. Hannibal het die tyd bestee om steun onder die Galliese stamme te konsolideer en hom in Suid -Italië te vestig. Die enigste ligpunt vir Rome, behalwe 'n tydelike opeenvolging van die slag van hul legioene, was 'n paar oorwinnings in Spanje deur die ouer Scipio -broers, wat Hannibal verhinder het om versterkings uit daardie gebied te ontvang.

'N Hele jaar na Trasimene was Hannibal egter nog in Italië, Fabian se termyn as diktator was op, en Rome het nog twee konsuls verkies en verskeie legioene opgerig om Hannibal uit Italië te verdryf. Die gevolg was die debakel van Cannae, waar Hannial nogmaals sy wil gebruik het om die minder geduldige van die Consuls in die stryd te lok. Hierdie keer het Rome ten minste 60 000 doodgemaak en gevange geneem (insluitend 80 senatore), die mees verpletterende nederlaag wat die stad ooit gely het.


Hannibal en die Puniese oorloë: opsomming en historiese agtergrond

Kartago is gestig deur Feniciërs in 814 vC, aan die kus van wat tans Tunisië is. Dit het gegroei tot 'n uitstekende kommersiële metropool met 'n heerlike dubbele hawe - 'n argitektoniese wonder vir almal om te sien. Op sy hoogste punt het sy bevolking moontlik 'n miljoen genader. In teenstelling met die populêre mite en die fantasieë van Flaubert in Salammbo, het die Kartagoërs nie met kinders opgeoffer nie. Die tofet in Kartago was 'n begraafplaas vir kinders, maar onlangse navorsing deur MH Fantar en ander het aan die lig gebring dat die bene van kinders van verskillende ouderdomme is, insluitend baie fetale oorblyfsels, sonder dat dit geoffer is - duidelik die gevolg van die kindersterftes van die tye. (Meer in 'n ander artikel.)

Kartago was nie 'n militaristiese stadstaat nie en het nie 'n gereelde leër onderhou nie. Huursoldate wat onder Carthaagse en soms Griekse offisiere gedien het, is gehuur om die stad te verdedig as die omstandighede dit vereis. Nietemin, uit hierdie betreklik vreedsame handelsgemeenskap ontstaan ​​'n familie, die Barcas, wat 'n paar van die grootste generaals en krygers sou oplewer wat die geskiedenis ooit geken het.

Drie lang oorloë, van 264 tot 146 v.G., het Kartago teengestaan ​​teen die militaristiese en ekspansionistiese mag van die opkomende Romeinse Republiek, gestig in 753 v.G., en wat, anders as Kartago, verpligte langdurige militêre diens van sy gelandde burgers en sy bondgenote vereis, en maak sosiale vooruitgang afhanklik van militêre ervaring en onderskeid.

Al drie die oorloë is deur Rome begin, die eerste (264-241) deur 'n leër na Sicilië te stuur, onder die skyn van verdediging van afvallige huursoldate by Messana, hoewel Rome 'n soortgelyke groep wat Rhegium oorgeneem het oor die nou seestraat swaar gestraf het. Italië uit Sicilië. Die voorspel tot die tweede oorlog (218-201) was die Romeinse anneksasie van Sardinië, 'n Kartago-gebied, in 'n tyd toe Kartago nie kon reageer nie weens die oorlog wat hy gedwing is om teen sy eie muiterige huursoldate te voer. Toe die Kartagoërs na Spanje uitgebrei het, het Rome die Ebro -verdrag ingestel wat hul vordering beperk het, 'n ooreenkoms aangegaan met Saguntum, suid van die Ebro (en dus binne Kartago -gebied), en die bloedbad van Kartago -partisane en bondgenote aangemoedig. Toe Kartago reageer, gebruik Rome dit as 'n verskoning om oorlog te verklaar. Die derde konflik (149-146), wat gevoer is teen 'n Kartago wat nie meer 'n bedreiging vir Rome inhou nie, het gelei tot die totale vernietiging van die stad na 'n beleg van drie jaar. In 'n wrede geval van etniese suiwering is die stad platgeslaan en tot op die grond afgebrand, die inwoners geslag en die oorlewendes in slawerny verkoop.

Die eerste groot generaal wat uit die Barca -familie ontstaan ​​het, was Hamilcar, vader van die meer bekende Hannibal en sy broers, Hasdrubal en Mago. Hy het geleef van ca. 275 tot 228 vC, en gedurende die laaste ses jaar van die eerste oorlog het hy suksesvolle guerrilla -operasies teen die Romeine op Sicilië uitgevoer. Hy was onoorwonne toe Carthago gedwing is om te kapituleer ná die vlootoorwinning van die Aegates -eilande in 241 vC. Hy was verantwoordelik vir die onttrekking van Kartago uit Sicilië en het opeenvolgende groepe huursoldate teruggestuur sodat hulle afsonderlik betaal kon word. Die landdroste van die stad het 'n wanberekening gemaak en gewag totdat alle huursoldate teruggekeer het, en daarna probeer om 'n vergoeding te kry. Die daaropvolgende muitery bedreig die voortbestaan ​​van die stad en veroorsaak 'n oorlog met gruweldade aan beide kante totdat Hamilcar die opstand verpletter het, op 'n stadium vyandelike magte in 'n kloof vasgekeer en deur sy olifante doodgetrap het.

Na die verlies van Sardinië, is Hamilcar onder bevel oor die uitbreiding van Kartago in Spanje. Sy oudste seun, Hannibal, toe nege jaar oud, het gevra om hom te vergesel en het na bewering 'n offer aan Baäl gesweer om nooit 'n vriend van die Romeine te wees nie. Dit impliseer nie gesweerde haat nie, maar 'n vasbeslotenheid om nie onderwerping aan Rome te aanvaar nie (meer in 'n ander artikel). In Spanje het Hamilcar die Carthaagse gebied uitgebrei tot met sy dood in 'n hinderlaag (in 228 vC) waar hy homself opgeoffer het om die lewens van sy seuns te red.

Die opvolger van Hamilcar was sy skoonseun, Hasdrubal the Handsome, 'n bekwame diplomaat en onderhandelaar, wat die Kartago-uitbreiding voortgesit het en Carthago Nova (moderne Cartagena) gestig het. Tydens sy bewind, in 226 of 225 v.G.J., het die Romeine 'n afvaardiging gestuur om die verdrag op te stel waarvolgens Kartago ingestem het om nie die grens van die rivier Ebro in wapens oor te steek nie. Hasdrubal is in 221 vermoor, waarna die 26-jarige Hannibal deur akklamasie tot die nuwe opperbevelvoerder van die Kartago-magte verkies is. Terwyl sy jonger broers, Hasdrubal en Mago, ook bekwame generaals geword het, wat later twee Romeinse leërs in Spanje verslaan het (in 211 vC), was dit Hannibal wat homself as 'n strategiese en taktiese genie van die eerste orde sou bewys.

Die charismatiese persoonlikheid en karakter van Hannibal het bewondering en toewyding by sy soldate gewek, wat 'n Hamilcar in hom gesien het. As 'n geleerde man, vlot in Grieks, Latyn en verskeie ander tale, het hy die ontberinge van sy manne gedeel, dieselfde kos geëet en selfs onder op die grond geslaap, net toegedraai in sy militêre mantel. Hy kon uiterste hitte en koue verduur en was onvermoeibaar. Hy het risiko's saam met sy mans geneem en het groot dapperheid getoon. Tydens al sy militêre veldtogte, insluitend die 16 jaar in Italië, toe sy leër van die land moes leef en hy nie die middele gehad het om sy huursoldate te betaal nie, het sy manne hom ongetwyfeld gevolg en hy het nooit muitery of opstand beleef nie.

Die eerste militêre toetse van Hannibal het plaasgevind gedurende die twee jaar (221-220) wat hy bestee het aan die uitbreiding en konsolidasie van die Kartago-beheer in Noordwes-Spanje. In sy eerste veldtog verslaan hy die Olcades, verower hul hoofstad, en veg die volgende jaar teen die Vaccaei en neem die stad Hermandica in. By sy terugkeer is hy aangeval deur 'n Keltiberiaanse konfederasie van Olcades, Vaccaei en Carpetani, wat 'n leër van 100,000 in die middel van Spanje in die gesig staar. Hier demonstreer Hannibal sy genie vir die eerste keer en behaal 'n onwaarskynlike oorwinning. Hy trek terug met sy veel kleiner leër oor die rivier die Taag, neem 'n verdedigingsposisie in en lok sy teenstanders om die rivier oor te steek. Toe hulle in die middel was, het sy kavalerie hulle afgekap terwyl die olifante diegene wat die rivieroewer bereik het, vertrap het. Toe val die hoofleër aan en versprei die vyand in alle rigtings. (Meer in 'n ander artikel.)

Na die Romeins-geïnspireerde aanval op Kartago-partisane in Saguntum en die aggressie van die Saguntines teen die Turboleti, wat bondgenote van Kartago was, het Hannibal opgeruk teen die stad en dit met 'n storm bestorm na 'n beleg van agt maande. Ondanks herhaalde versoeke het die Saguntines geen hulp van Rome gekry nie. Toe die stad val, in 219 vC, stuur die Romeine 'n afvaardiging na Noord -Afrika waarin hy eis dat Hannibal aan hulle oorgegee moet word. By die weiering van die Kartago -vergadering, verklaar Rome oorlog teen Kartago.

Die Romeine beheer die Middellandse See en sal na verwagting immuun wees teen aanvalle deur die see. Aangesien die massiewe Alpe in die noorde vermoedelik onbegaanbaar was vir 'n leër, was hulle vol vertroue dat die oorlog in Spanje en Noord -Afrika gevoer sou word. Nadat hulle die Kartagoë voorheen verslaan het, het hulle 'n maklike oorwinning verwag. Hulle was 'n groot verrassing, want hulle het nog nooit 'n militêre genie van Hannibal se kaliber teëgekom nie.

Hannibal se strategiese denke was gesond. Hy sou die oorlog na Italië neem met die mees onverwagte roete - direk oor die onbegaanbare Alpe. Hy sou die Romeine in die geveg verslaan, en demonstreer dat hulle geslaan kan word en steun van die Galliese stamme kan verkry. Die konfederasie van bondgenote in Rome - gewen deur verowering en natuurlik wrokend oor hul meesters - sou ontrafel as gevolg van Romeinse nederlae op die slagveld. Sy doel was om die onderdrukte volke van Italië, insluitend die Griekse stede in die suide van die skiereiland, te bevry. Hy was nie van plan om Rome te vernietig nie, maar om die Romeine tot hul gebied rondom die Tiber te beperk, soos blyk uit die teks van die verdrag wat hy in 215 vC met koning Philip V van Masedonië onderteken het. Sy plan het amper geslaag, want 'n aantal van Rome se bondgenote het wel na Hannibal gegaan en op 'n stadium het 12 van Rome se Latynse kolonies geweier om aan mannekrag te voorsien. Die oorlog kon gewen gewees het as Hannibal die nodige versterkings van Kartago ontvang het - die stadsleiers het hulle dwaas na Spanje gestuur om hul silwer myne te verdedig, eerder as na Italië, waar die belangrikste gevegte gevoer moes word. Dit was hierdie wanberekening wat hul uiteindelike nederlaag tot gevolg gehad het.

Die hoogste taktiese genie van Hannibal is onbetwis, hoewel die omvang daarvan dikwels nie besef word nie. In 218 vC, nadat hy die Alpe in 'n epiese stryd oorgesteek het, met slegs 20.000 infanterie en 6.000 perde aangekom het, verslaan hy die Romeine (wat 'n manlike potensiaal van 700.000 gehad het) eers by die Ticinus -rivier en daarna by die Trebia, en vermorsel hy die baie groter gekombineerde leër van konsuls P. Cornelius Scipio en Sempronius Longus. Die impulsiewe Sempronius is vroegoggend oor die vriesrivier gelok om aan te val en sy leër is deur 'n kombinasie van infanterie, kavallerie en olifante in stukke gesny, plus 'n hinderlaag van agter onder leiding van Hannibal se broer Mago. Terloops, dit is die enigste van die beroemde oorwinnings van Hannibal waaraan olifante deelgeneem het. Van die 37 olifante wat Hannibal oor die Alpe vergesel het, het slegs een die winter oorleef.

By die Trasimene -meer, in 217 v.C., het Hannibal daarin geslaag om feitlik sy hele leër in hinderlaag te verberg en die legioene van konsul Gaius Flaminius, 'n ervare militêre offisier wat voorheen 'n suksesvolle veldtog teen die Galliërs gelei het, vernietig. Maar Hannibal se meesterstuk op die slagveld was Cannae, in 216 v.G.J., waar hy die grootste Romeinse leër ooit ontmoet het, bestaande uit 80.000 infanterie en 'n kavalleriekontingent wat onlangse navorsing (besonderhede in 'n ander artikel) tot 12.000 stel, met sy eie leër van 40.000 infanterie en 10 000 perde. Die geveg is uitgevoer op 'n vlakte waar geen hinderlaag weggesteek kon word nie, maar Hannibal kon 'n dodelike strik in die oog spring. Volgens Polybius het die totale omhulsel van die Romeinse leër 70 000 Romeine op die slagveld laat sterf. Hannibal lost 5,000, mostly from the weaker Spanish and Gallic forces in the center of his formation, where he himself and his brother Mago commanded, and whose deployment was essential for the victory. Often criticized for not marching immediately against Rome following the battle, Hannibal’s decision was not a strategic error, as will be made clear in another article.

Claims that after Cannae Hannibal did not win any more battles because the Romans fought a war of attrition avoiding major clashes, and that his army was softened by wintering among the luxuries of Capua, are incorrect. Hannibal did achieve further victories every time some Roman general grew arrogant enough to think he could take on the great Barcid. For instance, in 212 he defeated consuls Q. Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius at Capua, although the Roman army escaped. The same year he was the victor at the Silarus, where he destroyed the army of the praetor M. Centenius Penula in Campania, and at the first battle of Herdonea, wiping out the forces of Gnaeus Fulvius in Apulia, with casualties comparable with those at lake Trasimenus. In 210 the second battle of Herdonea took place, where Hannibal destroyed the army of Fulvius Centumalus, who was killed. Hannibal remained undefeated during his 16 years in Italy. (More in another article.)

Hannibal’s genius shone even in the final battle, the one he supposedly lost, at Zama, in 202 BCE, against Publius Cornelius Scipio the Younger. The information in the classical sources indicates that he almost won that one, too, despite having an inferior army and lacking the cavalry forces he had had in Italy, for he managed to lure the superior enemy horse from the battlefield and was in the process of crushing the Roman infantry when Massinissa and his cavalry returned to the field to turn the tables in favor of the Romans. Recent research by Abdelaziz Belkhodja and others has raised a number of questions concerning the authenticity of this final battle, to be discussed in another article.

After the end of the second war with Rome, Hannibal served as Carthaginian magistrate (suffete) and was able to eliminate corruption and restore the city’s shattered economy. During his years of exile that followed, he assisted Antiochus III of Syria, Artaxias of Armenia, and Prusias of Bithynia, and remained true to his ideals, steadfastly refusing to become a vassal of Rome. Some have called Hannibal the last hero of the free world of Antiquity. After his death in 183 BCE, taking poison in order to prevent the Romans from capturing him after being betrayed by King Prusias in Bithynia, nothing could stand in the way of the expansion of what would become the predatory Roman Empire.

Verwysings:
Belkhodja, A. (2012). Hannibal Barca: L’histoire veritable. Apollonia (Tunis).
Fantar, M. H. (1998). Carthage, the Punic City. Alif, les Editions de la Mediterranee.
Faulkner, N. (2008). Rome: Empire of the Eagles. Pearson/Longman.
Lancel, S. (1998). Hannibal. Blackwell.
Mosig, Y., & Belhassen, I. (2006). “Revision and reconstruction in the Punic Wars: Cannae revisited”. The International Journal of the Humanities, 4(2), 103-110.
Mosig, Y., & Belhassen, I. (2007). “Revision and reconstruction in the second Punic War: Zama-whose victory?” The International Journal of the Humanities, 5(9), 175-186.
Mosig, Y. (2009). “The Barcids at war: Historical introduction.” Ancient Warfare, 3:4, 6-8.
Polybius (Patton translation). Die geskiedenis (Loeb Classical Library). Harvard.

© Yozan Mosig, 2012
(Note: A somewhat different version of this article appeared in Ancient Warfare magazine in 2009, and parts are used here with the kind permission of J. Oorthuys.)


How close did Carthage come to victory during the Punic Wars?

It seems that Carthage squandered many advantages in the First Punic War, including wealth, manpower, colonial assets, and a large navy. In the Second Punic War, Carthage obliterated Rome in battle after battle, but failed to gain a strategic advantage. The Third Punic War was essentially a siege, but the question remains how close to total defeat did Rome get, and what sort of terms would a victorious Carthage impose on a defeated Rome?

The closest they would've come would've been the First Punic War - before Carthage had to give up much of its overseas empire and before the Romans expanded its control into Spain and Sicily. The population and industrial capacity difference wouldn't have been as big as in the later wars.

By the time of the Second Punic Wars, Carthage was fighting an uphill battle (like Japan vs USA during WW2). I've read that the Romans had 850,000

770,000 people conscripted or on their conscription rolls during the Second Punic War, and this represented about 10% of their population. So the Romans had something like

8 million people and 300k+ male citizens in the city of Rome. Carthage, on the other hand, only had around 3-4 million people in their entire empire and only 160-180k male citizens in the city of Carthage around that time of the Second Punic War (according to Dexter Hoyos?). So by the time of the Second Punic War, Rome's population advantage was huge and even the string of victories by Hannibal couldn't reverse Carthage's fortunes when they got bogged down in a long war of attrition.

The fact that Rome was able to replace entire 50,000+ man armies back then still boggles my mind.

The issue here compares the largely agrarian society of Rome vs the commercial Carthage. While the population of Rome would largely be expected to contribute to the war effort by serving, the Carthaginian uses mercenary, quite a lot of them. If you count the amt of forces under each commander, you don't really see too big of a discrepancy for both sides during the Second Punic War.

So it's not really fair to say that Rome's advantage in the numbers so long as Carthage can keep up with the mercenaries, and mostly Carthage did. Mago received a fat purse to hire locals, as well as a company of mercenary just before Carthage, recall Hannibal, not to mention the numerous times Hasdrubal and Mago got money and reinforcement or Sicily or Sardinia, and even Hannibal got reinforced a few times.

In hindsight perhaps nooit because fundamentally Rome & Carthage were fighting two different wars.

Carthage to a large extent acted in the traditional sense, with the war having to lead to some negotiated end. Rome on the other hand had that tendency to escalate conflicts and keep pushing for total victory. It is something few of her opponents did and faced with repeated setbacks, they were prone to just come back and turn conflicts into slugfests they eventually won. Pyrrhus (& the Samnites before him) was completely baffled by the Roman unwillingness to concede defeat. He lost interests, the war dragged on & Rome eventually won. Carthage similarly crashed against this unwillingness to concede.

Fundamentally Rome & Carthage were thus fighting an uneven war, victory was far more elusive for the Carthaginians since they fought on unequal terms.

(From: Kurt Raaflaub (ed.), “War & Peace in the Ancient World” Goldsworthy, “Pax Romana”)

Few wars ended with total annihilation. Other Mediterranean states in Rome's position at various points in punic wars would probably have sued for peace and given tribute, conceded territory etc. Rome had this thing where they only made peace after winning a major battle, and they basically kept the war going until they won.

There's debate about why/how which iirc mostly tends to come down to Rome's deep pool of manpower (partly because it got men rather than money from its allies) and/or cultural and political factors that made it especially stubborn (e.g. the consul system meant nobody wanted to be the one to surrender, the focus on honour, though that was big across the Mediterranean).

Another key factor is that Hannibal seems to have assumed that having defeated Roman armies heɽ flip other Italian confederates of Rome into allying with him against Rome. Very few did. I don't know how much this was love, fear or rational self interest.

Another key factor is that Hannibal seems to have assumed that having defeated Roman armies heɽ flip other Italian confederates of Rome into allying with him against Rome. Very few did. I don't know how much this was love, fear or rational self interest.

I don't think he held that belief post-Cannae, seeing how he no longer operates in these regions to flip the Latin communities. On the other hand, he fliped plenty of Italian confederates and Greek communities.

Carthage had a problem - its wealthy oligarchs, powerful merchant families involved in the Carthaginian trade across the Mediterranean that controlled the Carthaginian Senate - did not like funding the war. They repeatedly rejected Hannibal's requests for aid and more funds. The Oligarchs didn't really trust Hannibal (heɽ grown up campaigning with his father, mostly in Iberia, and they were worried about a powerful and victorious general coming back and taking power). Hannibal was also elected leader by the Carthaginian army in Iberia after his uncle, the former commander, was assassinated . So the oligarchs also felt that Hannibal wasn't "their man."

The Carthaginian Senate also never authorized Hannibal's initial attacks in Spain that started the war in the first place, and so were never really behind it. After that attack in Spain, Rome protested, and asked Carthage to choose war or peace Carthage said "why don't you decide?" and Rome chose war.

The key Roman leader, Quintus Fabius, recognized Carthage was never going to properly support Hannibal, which is one of the reasons he adopted a policy of delay to wear Hannibal's army out.

So if Carthage's oligarchs had mobilized to back Hannibal in the same way that Rome's mobilized to support Roman armies, Carthage could have won. After Cannae, there was a brief window where Carthage could have attacked Rome, but it would have taken months and months of a siege and the Romans likely would have rallied in time.


The Punic Wars and Expansion

In the 3rd and 2nd Centuries BC, Rome, after consolidating its hold on the Italian peninsula would soon come up against the power of the Mediterranean, Carthage. Carthage was Phoenician city founded in 814 BC, and the term Punic relates to the Latin and Greek words for Phoenician. From the founding of the Roman Republic, the powerful Carthaginians had long supported Rome in its bid to secure its own independence and strength in Italy. As late as 279 BC, the two states were allied against Pyrrhus of Epirus in order to contain his expansionist goals, but as Rome's strength grew as a result, so did the rivalry and animosity between the two.

Carthage was, in this time period, by far the greatest sea power on the Mediterranean. Naval authority and vast merchant routes brought wealth and power to the North African city. By the time Rome gained control of all of Italy, Carthage held sway over North Africa from Libya to Gibraltar, much of southern Spain and the islands of Corsica, Sardinia and part of Sicily. Contact prior to Roman control of Italy was limited, but with Rome now within striking distance of Sicily, conflict was inevitable. When the Sicilian city of Messana revolted against Carthaginian rule in 264 BC, the Romans, once again, jumped at the opportunity to expand under the guise of aiding another city.

This initial Roman invasion of Sicily touched off a series of three wars that would last over 100 years. Some of the greatest battles and commanders in world history were on center stage in the conflicts. Men such as Hannibal and Scipio Africanus were immortalized through the legendary achievement and by the end, the ingenuity and technology brought on by warfare advanced Rome to incredible power. Carthage would end up a blip on the radar of history, while Rome became the power of the western world through its victories.

Conflict with Carthage, however, was not the only source of strife for the growing Roman Republic. In some cases, Rome's expansion beyond Carthaginian territory grew as a direct correlation to the Punic Wars. Illyricum, on the Adriatic, Macedonia and Greece would all become the target of Roman domination and political whims. The years 264 to 146 BC, would transform Rome from a young Republic to a powerful Empire.


During the punic wars, how did the Romans continue to recruit armies after massive defeats like cannae where 50 to 70 thousand Romans died and why wasn’t Carthage able to do the same while having control over more resources than Rome?

Rome slowly but surely made its allies part of its system, for every defeat of a neighbouring village Rome allowed the defeated village to become a part of the Roman system. Subdued foes fought for it as part of the Roman army, and while subdued elites were not Senators and didn't have citizenship they still very much formed part of the Roman system and reaped the rewards from being part of it.

This gave the Romans a huge pool of manpower to play with compared to other states. Especially when Rome started to be willing to hand out citizenship.

Carthage on the other hand was a city state, it relied on a couple of field armies led by a small core if its citizens and never made any particular attempt to expand its citizenship or rights to its subjects. Allies served as just allies for the campaign or war they were involved in. Foreign elites were bribed and given gifts but never really integrated. Soldiers were hired as soldiers rather than serving as part and parcel of an integrated army.

Its also worth noting that territory is not equal to resources.

Lets take the Second Punic War as an example:

While on paper Carthage was larger in the Second Punic War you need to examine which bits were under actual control and how long that was the case.

Carthage controlled much of North Africa and Spain, however only a chunk of North Africa was actually Carthaginian territory by itself, the rest of it was held by subject Numidians who had a frequently antagonistic relationship with Carthage. Meanwhile in Spain it was Hannibals father who had done much of the legwork in turning it into "Carthaginian territory" if we look at Spain at the time though it was made of a plethora of tribes and villages who were locked into a raiding and prestige lifestyle. Again this ensured the territory was in no way actually Carthaginian. These people were fighters, they fought for honour and for money with each other and against the Carthaginians. As long as the Carthaginians could give them money and show they were strong they would fight for them, the minute weakness was shown then there would be no incentive to fight, which is just what happened when the Romans started to make inroads to the area.

Compare this to Italy where Rome controlled a much more dense web of allies in the Latin states immediately around it, these areas where very much part of the system and willingly sent men to fight for Rome and kept on doing so throughout the dark days of Hannibal right until there were literally no more men to send. Its in the South where Hannibal made some gains amongst the former Greek city-states but even then surprisingly few of them turned and none of them were especially useful at reinforcing Hannibal when they did turn. In a way they crippled him because the more defected the more Hannibal had to protect and he had only a single army to do that with. Rome could very much grind him down and take city after city and leave him with no good choices to make.

Couple that with the crippling logistics issues with trying to get Carthage to actually reinforce him and you see why he couldn't win.

On that note we'll move onto logistics and politics.

Now logistically sailing in the ancient world relied on access to food and water for the crews, any attempt to reinforce Hannibal in Italy would rely on sailing for several days via hostile territory and in the face of enemy resistance and landed a few thousand more troops. Not exactly the easiest thing to do.

Politically there was also the clear difference between the Roman and Carthaginian senate. Each year the Romans could and did give clear priorities to one theatre or another and allocate resources for the entire state, this was light years ahead of the Carthaginian effort which only seemingly knew what Hannibal was about to do when the Romans arrived and asked to them to ensure he didn't cross the Ebro and attack Roman allies. There was a distinct level of infighting and not knowing what the left hand was doing compared to the Roman method of clear allocation and command responsibilities in the war effort.

Main source: The Punic Wars - Adrian Goldsworthy

Regarding Carthage's control of Africa: The defection of Masinissa was a significant boon to Scipio's African campaign - Numidian cavalry was storied at the time for its mobility and skirmishing skill, as mentioned by Polybius and practiced to devastating effect at Trebbia and Cannae, for example - tipping, as it did, the cavalry balance that had often previously been in Carthage's favour.

Sorry if the sole reference to The Histories breaks forum rules, I intended this as an addendum as opposed to a full answer.

I think this comment broadly hits the spot, and that Rome for demographic and structural reasons, some of which are outlined above, had greater reserves of manpower than did Carthage. However, the Roman manpower advantage was not as crushing as you might think: Carthage fielded hundreds of thousands of men and could raise enormous armies repeatedly on very short notice, as they did several times over in Scipio's African campaign. Carthage's ability to raise good quality troops in large numbers from Spain was actually exceptional. Carthaginian effort between Ilipa and Zama (206-202) compares well with Roman efforts between Ticinius and Trebia and Cannae (218-216), especially considering the loss of Spain's enormous manpower and material resources in 206. Carthage may have even been able to field another army after Zama, but Hannibal understood that having lost his best troops, it wouldn't have helped.

Hannibal brings me to another important point, that the political fragmentation of the Carthaginian government is a bit exaggerated in the sources. Let's note that Goldsworthy is not a Punic expert (not that there is anything wrong with his book). Dexter Hoyos, however, is such an expert, and he argues that Carthage was not a Roman style oligarchy but almost a military dictatorship controlled by the Barcid family. The other major faction was that of the Hannonids, and it is these two factions that put forward the major generals of the war. The Carthaginian government was extremely supportive of Hannibal as the Senate was filled with his clients and supporters and the other various organs of state were also stacked with Barcids. Practical strategic difficulties prevented them from reinforcing Hannibal in Italy, but he was left to his own devices for over a decade while Carthage poured resources into tying up the Romans in Spain. Barcid political domination had been developing ever since Hamilcar went to Spain and was very secure by the crossing of the Ebro, so I don't think the fragmentation of Carthaginian government is a major factor. Note that even after Zama, Hannibal had to convince the Carthaginians to give up and not the other way around. There was no real lack of will or resources on the part of Carthage, just the practical realities of a long series of crushing defeats.

Regarding sources, I cannot recommend Hannibal's Dynasty by Dexter Hoyos highly enough, particularly in addition to Goldsworthy's general treatment mentioned in the above post.

Great answer. This guy knows his Punic Wars. It's a similar story with Pyrrhus and Rome. Pyrrhus was successful against the Romans initially, but he could not keep up with the Republic's ability to repopulate it's legions. There's obviously a lot more to the Pyrrhus /Rome story, but that's the salient aspect. If OP is interested in further reading, any of Dexter Hoyos' work on the Punic Wars is well worth looking into.

To my mind, the decisive difference lies in morale. While it is difficult to know with certainty the exact percentage of the Carthaginian army that was made up of mercenaries, as the extant histories of the Punic War (particularly Polybius in this case) are all from Roman or pro-Roman authors, a telling difference can be seen in the conflicts that arose among the respective soldiers of both armies around the time in question. In Carthage's case, the Mercenary War erupted in the aftermath of the first Punic war over a payment dispute. By contrast, after the Second Punic war, Rome became a major world power, and in the campaigns that followed, the soldiers were in many ways pressed on both sides, with the land of the still largely unsalaried citizen militia being forced to go further and further afield in campaigns of conquest that they themselves reaped little from as their fields back home went fallow. Yet when open revolt did break out among the Roman forces a little over a century after the Second Punic war, it was over the citizenship status of the allied cities on the Italian mainland.

This points to a major disparity between the two groups of soldiers. One was motivated to fight largely by promises of material gain, while the other was a part of a culture that placed great emphasis on patriotism, honor, and sacrifice pro patria.

In terms of how this difference effected the actual recruitment ability of the Roman army as compared to Carthage, it can be helpful to look at the big picture. Mercenary armies, with the occasional exception (like the Swiss Guard), tend to be much less inclined to fight against heavy odds when compared to people defending their homeland or otherwise motivated by the above mentioned factors. The wars and strategic changes of the twentieth century have underscored the importance of these distinctions in the mindsets of soldiers, and it would be inconceivable for a modern nation to begin a conflict without serious consideration of how to best destroy the psychological drive to continue fighting in the adversary. For the Romans and their allies the fact that they stood underneath something bigger than themselves allowed them to hoist themselves upright after losses that would have devastated nearly any other army from the period.

Sources: Polybius - The Histories Stephen Dando-Collins - Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion Garrett G. Fagam - History of Ancient Rome (TTC Course)

This points to a major disparity between the two groups of soldiers. One was motivated to fight largely by promises of material gain, while the other was a part of a culture that placed great emphasis on patriotism, honor, and sacrifice pro patria.

This sounds good, but I’m a bit uncomfortable with it. Your point about Rome’s armies makes sense for Roman citizens, but it seems to neglect the Italian allies. What motivated them? Why did so many switch sides after Cannae?

It seems rather simplistic to apply such motivations to extremely diverse coalitions of allies who underwent constantly shifting fortunes over such a long war.

citizen militia being forced to go further and further afield in campaigns of conquest that they themselves reaped little from as their fields back home went fallow.

There's not really very much evidence to support this view anymore, although a few people like Keaveney still cling to it. We hear about a few very unpopular wars in the wake of the Hannibalic war. The Spanish Wars weren't very popular, for example, and famously the assembly voted "no" when asked to go to war with Macedon again in 200 and had to be asked to change their mind. But these actions were taken in the decades immediately after the war with Hannibal, when Italy was exhausted and generally unwilling to commit to further wars. The idea as forwarded by Brunt that the Roman soldier went off for years at a time for campaign and coming back to find his farm deserted and his wife and infant children (now grown up) homeless and in poverty doesn't really seem to fit social or economic models as we understand them. Rosenstein points out that the evidence seems to suggest strongly that Roman peasants married later than we might expect, in their late 20s or early 30s (which apparently is paralleled in other pre-industrial societies), well after their major campaigning years were over. Moreover, the idea of the individual and his nuclear family owning a farm seems to be anachronistic. More likely Roman peasants lived and worked on the same land as extended families, with several generations occupying the same or adjacent plots, and Rosenstein (or is it De Ligt? I always forget which says what) actually argues that military campaigning would have been an economic advantage to those families that had the opportunity to yield a son up for military service. The agricultural season is uneven in its workload, and Cato famously says that he prefers to hire free workers during busy times like the harvest than to buy more slaves, since the slaves will have nothing to do in the off season and he'll be feeding idle workers. For much of the year these extended families likely put pressure on their means, since while they had plenty of workers for busy periods they likely strained the capacity of the land in the slower seasons. Military service, in this view, would be a way to offload some of the surplus local population and, importantly, provide the family with much-desired plunder--contrary to the belief that they "reaped little," the Roman soldier and his family benefited rather greatly from plunder, a major motivator in enlistment and campaigning as far back as the existence of the Republican state.

Those like Keaveney that still cling to the view that soldiers were being impoverished by long campaigning mostly do so because what the texts actually beskryf is not a demographic crisis in which people are not enlisting or not turning up for the census (the natural conclusion if we combine the findings above with the odd census figures of the second half of the second century) but rural Italians straight up not having homes. Keaveney points out that Plutarch's Ti. Gracchus laments that while the wild animals of Italy have shelters the Italians themselves have no homes, and Plutarch says that Ti. (or rather he says that C. Gracchus says that he Ti. Gracchus did) observed while traveling through Etruria a shortage of free workers. Which is a little weird, since Etruria is not usually identified with the large estates that Ti. is usually associated with. Daar was geen ager publicus in Etruria, and archaeological surveys have turned up no reason to suppose there was a sharp decline in small-time farming plots in the region. The texts don't actually say, though, that small farmers were heading off to war and coming back to ruin, as Brunt described. Appian says that estate-holders preferred to hire slaves rather than pay for free workers who might get called off to war (which runs contradictory to the preferences Cato expresses) and that the Italians were pushed off their land and melted away under the pressure of tribute and military service. There's a great controversy right now over whether Appian and Plutarch are reporting a state of events that was actually real, or whether they were just reporting what Ti. Gracchus and others thought was the problem. I'm not so sure the two views are incompatible. After all, what Keaveney and Brunt describe is not strictly what the texts say happened. Our major traditions are in agreement that the issue was Italians and free Roman farmers being pushed off their land by large estate-holders, not that military service was causing them to go bankrupt, which seems contradictory to what we know about peasant society and the agricultural economy.


The Takeaway From All This

Carthage was pretty much the last Mediterranean superpower that could stand up to Rome. After their defeat the known world would change completely as Rome became die dominant force. There wouldn’t be an external threat like Hannibal for another 700 years when Rome fell to the barbarians. Rome would now enter a phase where it’s existence wasn’t threatened by far-off wars with evil civilizations, but civil wars between ambitious men and internal chaos.


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