Harry Hopkins - Geskiedenis

Harry Hopkins - Geskiedenis


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Harry Hopkins

1890- 1946

Amerikaanse diplomaat

Harry Hopkins is gebore in Siox City Iowa op 17 Augustus 1890. Hopkins het die Grinnel College bygewoon. Nadat hy afgestudeer het, het hy 'n pos by Christodora House aangeneem. Harry Hopkins het sy loopbaan as maatskaplike werker begin. In 1915 word hy aangestel as hoof van die departement van kinderwelsyn in New York. 'N Slegte oog het hom verhinder om in die Eerste Wêreldoorlog te dien. Hy het vir die Rooi Kruis gewerk waar hy direkteur van die Suidelike Streek geword het.

In 1931 het Franklin Roosevelt Hopkins aangestel as hoof van die New York Temporary Relief Agency; 'n werk wat hy met ywer verrig het. Tussen 1933 en 1938 het Hopkins enkele van die grootste New Deal -programme bestuur.

In 1938 ontwikkel Hopkins maagkanker. Daarna het Hopkins 'n spesiale assistent van Roosevelt geword en in die Withuis gewoon. Hopkins het al die groot konferensies van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog bygewoon en baie gereis na Roosevelt, ondanks sy siekte.

Boeke


Harry Hopkins

"Roosevelt het Hopkins implisiet [totaal] vertrou - sy instinkte vertrou en sy lojaliteit vertrou. Geen president het ooit so 'n vertroue in 'n ander man geplaas nie, geen president het 'n ander man sulke mag en invloed gegee nie."

June Hopkins, kleindogter van Harry Hopkins, in Harry Hopkins: skielike held, onverskrokke hervormer

Vanaf 'n nederige begin het Harry Hopkins hoog gestyg in die Amerikaanse regering gedurende die 1930's en 1940's. Hopkins se lojale diens aan sy land het president gehelp Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945 bedien 1933–45 sien inskrywing) lei die Verenigde State deur die Groot Depressie (1929–41) en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog (1939–45), twee van die ergste krisisse van die twintigste eeu. Hopkins was uniek gekwalifiseerd om die New Deal -hulpprogramme van die Roosevelt -administrasie te administreer. Onder leiding van Roosevelt gedurende die dertigerjare in die kuns van politiek en diplomasie, het Hopkins tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog die president se verteenwoordiger en boodskapper geword.


Inhoud

Die Mk VIII was die ligte tenk wat deur Vickers-Armstrong ontwerp is om die opvolger van die Mk VII Tetrarch vir die Britse leër te wees. Die maatskappy was van voorneme dat die Mk VIII die ontwerp van die Tetrarch op 'n aantal gebiede sou verbeter, veral die beskerming van wapenrusting. Dit het 'n dikker wapenrusting as die Tetrarch, met die voorste romp en die rewolwer van die rewolwer tot 'n dikte van 38 millimeter (1,5 duim) en die sywapen tot 17 millimeter (0,67 in), en die rewolwer en romp het meer skuins oppervlaktes gekry as die Tetrarch om skulpe te help afbuig. [2] Die afmetings van die Tetrarch -ontwerp is ook verander, aangesien die Mk VIII 0,15 m langer was, 0,38 m groter en die gewig daarvan groter was, beteken dit dat die tenk nie langer lugdraagbaar wees, aangesien dit te swaar was om deur die General Aircraft Hamilcar-sweeftuig gedra te word. [2]

Dieselfde 12-silinder enjin as in die Tetrarch is op die Mk VIII aangebring, hoewel die verhoogde gewig beteken dat die maksimum spoed daarvan tot 48 km/h afgeneem het. Die bewapening het dieselfde gebly as die van die Tetrarch: een masjiengeweer en 'n 2-ponder 40-millimeter (1,6 in) hoofgeweer. [2] Die tenk het ook die ongewone stuurstelsel wat in die Tetrarch -ontwerp gebruik is, behou om hierdie stuur- en meganiese stelsel draaie te behaal deur die sywaartse beweging van padwiele, wat die spore gebuig het. Toe die bestuurder aan die stuurwiel draai, het al die agt padwiele nie net gedraai nie, maar ook gekantel om die spore te buig en die tenk te laat draai, en die idee was om die meganiese spanning en vermorsing van krag wat deur die tradisionele stelsel gebruik word, te verminder. een spoor rem. [3] Anders as die Tetrarch was die stuurstelsel van die Mk VIII kragondersteun. [1]

Vickers-Armstrong het die Mk VIII-ontwerp in September 1941 by die Oorlogskantoor ingedien, en in dieselfde maand het die Tank Board van die Oorlogskantoor 1000 tenks bestel, wat in November tot 2,410 toegeneem het. Die raad het gehoop dat die produksie in Junie 1942 teen 'n koers van ongeveer 100 per maand kan begin, wat deur Metro-Cammell, 'n filiaal van Vickers-Armstrong, vervaardig kan word. Op hierdie tydstip het die tenk ook die spesifikasie nommer A25 gekry en die naam van Harry Hopkins [2] Die produksie het in Junie 1942 begin soos verwag, maar dit het onmiddellik probleme ondervind, maar dit word nie gespesifiseer nie, maar dit blyk dat die toetsing van die prototipes van die Mk VIII wat deur Vickers-Armstrong verskaf is, het 'n aantal kwessies laat ontstaan. 'N Minuut wat die ministerie van verskaffing in September aan die premier, Winston Churchill, gestuur het van die ministerie van verskaffing, het gesê dat daar 'n vertraging in die aflewering van die tenk is as gevolg van ontwikkelingsprobleme, en 'n verslag wat in Desember deur die oorlogskantoor uitgereik is, het gesê dat 'n aantal wysigings nodig sou wees voordat die produksie voortgesit kon word, is die voorveringstelsel uitgesonder as 'n uitgebreide aanpassing. [2] Daar word nog steeds probleme ondervind in Julie 1943, met 'n verslag van die Fighting Vehicle Proving Establishment wat aandui dat daar steeds ernstige gebreke in die modelle wat getoets word, gevind het, het die probleme so skerp geword dat die proewe van die Mk VIII vroeër as beplan is laat vaar . Teen 31 Augustus 1943 is slegs ses tenks van Mk VIII vervaardig, vergeleke met 'n oorlogskantoor van 100 teen die begin van die jaar. Hoewel die Oorlogskantoor volgehou het om die ontwerp te behou en in November 1943 'n amptelike vereiste gestel het om 750 tenks te bou, was daar slegs ongeveer 100 gebou toe die produksie amptelik in Februarie 1945 geëindig het. [4]

Teen die middel van 1941 het amptenare by die oorlogskantoor en in die weermag uiteindelik besluit dat ligte tenks as 'n konsep 'n aanspreeklikheid is en te kwesbaar is om deur die Britse weermag gebruik te word. [5] Dit was te wyte aan die swak prestasie van Britse ligte tenks tydens die Slag van Frankryk, wat veroorsaak is toe 'n tekort aan tenks wat ontwerp was om vyandelike tenks te betrek, daartoe gelei het dat ligte tenks teen die Duitse wapenrusting ontplooi is, wat veroorsaak het dat die groot slagoffers tot die oorlogskantoor gelei het heroorweeg die geskiktheid van die ontwerp van die ligte tenk. [6] Daar is ook bevind dat die vooroorlogse rol van die ligtenk, die van verkenning, beter uitgevoer is deur verkennermotors met kleiner bemanningslede en beter landloopvermoëns. [5] [6] Teen die tyd dat aansienlike getalle van die Mk VIII deur Metro-Cammell vervaardig is, was hulle dus reeds verouderd en het hulle nie gevegte gesien nie. Daar was 'n vereiste vir 'n beperkte aantal ligte tenks binne die organisasie van Britse pantserdivisies, maar die Amerikaanse M5 Stuart-ligtenk het dit reeds bereik. [7] 'n Beleidsverslag wat in Desember 1942 uitgereik is, dui daarop dat die tenk uitgereik kan word aan verkenningsregimente of spesiale ligte tenkregimente wat vir gespesialiseerde operasies opgerig is. Hierdie voorstelle is bespreek en weggegooi, en in plaas daarvan is besluit dat die tenks wat gebou is, aan die Royal Air Force oorhandig moet word vir gebruik in die verdediging van vliegvelde en lugbase. [1]

Die Mk VIII is ook bespreek in terme van 'n ander plan, bekend as die draervleuel, in hierdie plan, vliegoppervlaktes, soos vlerke, sou op die Mk VIII aangebring word, sodat dit deur 'n vervoervliegtuig gesleep kon word en dan ter ondersteuning kon sweef van magte in die lug. Die plan is egter laat vaar nadat die prototipe neergestort het nadat dit opgestyg het. [1]

'N Enkele variant van die Mk VIII is ontwerp, die Alecto selfaangedrewe geweer. Oorspronklik bekend as die Harry Hopkins 1 CS (vir "Close Support"), het die Alecto uiteindelik die spesifikasie nommer A25 E2 van die algemene personeel gekry. Die Alecto het 'n 95-millimeter (3,7 duim) houwitser gemonteer op 'n liggewig weergawe van die Mk VIII-onderstel waarmee die rewolwer verwyder is sodat die houwitser laag in die romp geplaas kon word, en die wapenrusting tot 'n dikte van 10 verminder 4 mm (0,39 tot 0,16 in) om sy gewig te verminder, wat lei tot 'n maksimum snelheid van 50 km/h. [8] Die Alecto is ontwerp om die halwe spore met ondersteuningswapens te vervang, soos haubits, wat Britse formasies in die lug tydens die konflik gebruik het, en is eers laat 1942 ontwikkel. Dit kon ook in plaas van 'n 75 mm geweer toegerus gewees het gepantserde motors. [9] Die Oorlogskantoor het 2 200 Alectos bestel, maar slegs 'n klein aantal is ooit vervaardig, waarvan nie een baie diens in bulldozers omskep het vir gebruik deur Royal Engineer -eenhede nie. [10]


Akkuraatheid in die media

'N Nuwe boek met die titel The Sword and the Shield het aansienlike media -aandag getrek omdat dit gebaseer is op afskrifte van KGB -dokumente wat ses jaar gelede uit die Sowjetunie gesmokkel is. Vasily Mitrokhin, 'n KGB -argivaris, het baie jare lank KGB -lêers noukeurig gekopieer. Hy het sy afskrifte tot 1992 onder die vloer van sy landhuis weggesteek, toe die Britse intelligensie daarin geslaag het om hom en sy ses stamme gekopieerde dokumente uit Rusland te haal. Christopher Andrew, 'n Cambridge -don, het nou 'n boek oor hulle gepubliseer.

Die New York Times, The Washington Post, 60 Minutes en Nightline het almal belangrike verhale oor die onthullings wat Christopher Andrew uit Mitrokhin se argief gepluk het, gedoen. Hulle het 'n 87-jarige Engelse ouma aan die lig gebring wat atoomgeheime aan die Sowjette wat tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog begin het, bekendgemaak het en wat nog nooit vervolg is nie. Hulle het vertel van die Sowjet -planne om ons elektriese kragaanlegte en oliepypleidings te saboteer in geval van oorlog. Hulle het vertel van 'n Sowjet -poging om die verspreiding van die VIGS -virus op die Amerikaanse weermag te blameer, disinformasie wat die akkuraatheid in die media 12 jaar gelede onthul het toe Dan Rather dit op die CBS Evening News gepubliseer het.

Maar het hulle almal die grootste nuus in die Andrew -boek misgekyk? Nuwe bewyse wat bewys dat Harry Hopkins, die naaste en invloedrykste adviseur van president Franklin D. Roosevelt tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, 'n Sowjet -agent was. Andrew het dit in 'n boek wat hy in 1990 geskryf het, berig op grond van inligting verskaf deur Oleg Gordievsky, 'n hoë KGB-offisier wat ook deur die Britse intelligensie uit die Sowjetunie gesmokkel is. Gordievsky het berig dat Iskhak Ahkmerov, die KGB -offisier wat tydens die oorlog die onwettige Sowjet -agente in die VSA beheer het, gesê het dat Hopkins “die belangrikste van alle Sowjet -oorlogsagente in die Verenigde State was”.

Hopkins se geheime vergaderings met Ahkmerov was aan niemand bekend voordat Gordievsky dit onthul het nie. Hulle het begin voordat Hopkins in Julie 1941 na Moskou reis, 'n maand nadat die Duitsers die Sowjetunie binnegeval het. Sy aandrang om hulp aan Stalin te bied sonder om stringe daaraan verbonde, regverdig Ahkmerov se beoordeling van sy prestasie. Daar is bewyse dat Hopkins selfs so ver gegaan het dat hy uraan na die Sowjetunie gestuur het om hulle te help om die atoombom te ontwikkel. Ten spyte hiervan het Andrew aangevoer dat Harry Hopkins ''n bewustelose eerder as 'n bewuste agent' was.

Mitrokhin se dokumente toon dat Hopkins die Sowjet -ambassadeur gewaarsku het dat die FBI geleer het deur 'n fout wat hy in die huis van Steve Nelson, 'n Sowjet -onwettige agent, geplaas het dat Nelson geld by die ambassade kry. Hy ontmoet Ahkmerov af en toe en gee hom inligting om na Moskou te stuur en ontvang geheime boodskappe van Stalin.

Andrew probeer 'n onskuldige gesig hierop plaas en sê Hopkins gebruik Ahkmerov as 'n 'agterkanaal' om met Moskou te kommunikeer. Ray Wannall, voormalige FBI-assistent-direkteur vir teen-intelligensie, sê dat hy altyd vermoed het dat Hopkins 'n Sowjet-agent was en dat dit 'n bewys is van sy verraad.

Reed Irvine en Cliff Kincaid

Gereed om terug te veg teen vooroordeel in die media?
Sluit vandag by ons aan deur aan AIM te skenk.


Waarom weet nie meer mense van Harry Hopkins nie?

Harry Hopkins het in my laaste jaar aan die St. Andrews -universiteit in Skotland my lewe binnegegaan toe my dosent, afkomstig uit Texas, wou hê dat ek die reputasie moes beoordeel van 'n man wat 'deur 'n valdeur in die geskiedenis' geval het.

Ek het nog nooit van Harry Hopkins gehoor nie, en het, soos my onderwyser ongelukkig opgemerk het, ook nie iemand anders in die Verenigde Koninkryk gehad nie. Tog het hy my vertel dat Brittanje se voortbestaan ​​in die oorlog in die lig van die Nazi -aanslag baie te danke was aan 'n man wat Winston Churchill '' 'n vuurtoring '' genoem het, waaruit die balke geskyn het wat groot vloot na die hawe gelei het.

Die herinnering aan die gesprek het my bygebly. Ek hoop ek het veertig jaar later lig gewerp op die deurslaggewende rol wat Harry Hopkins in die Britse oorlogspoging gedurende die desperate maande van 1941 gespeel het.

Die verhaal van Harry Hopkins se missie na Londen in die oorlogstyd begin met die vertrek van die gediskrediteerde Amerikaanse ambassadeur, Joseph Kennedy, in Oktober 1940. Kennedy was baie openlik oor sy bewondering vir Hitler se Duitsland en om die kans van Engeland in die oorlog af te sien. Hy vertrek op die hoogtepunt van die blits toe dit duidelik word dat hy nie meer welkom is by die hof van St.

Kennedy het egter 'n vraag gestel wat aan die begin van daardie jaar rondom Washington weerklink het. Kan Brittanje oorleef? Was dit die moeite werd om hulp aan 'n land te stuur wat binnekort gedwing sou word om oor te gee aan Duitsland? Roosevelt het besluit om Harry Hopkins na Londen te stuur om uit te vind. Toe premier Winston Churchill die identiteit van die gesant hoor, het hy eenvoudig gesê: "Wie?" Dit was 'n goeie vraag. Niemand in Londen het iets van Hopkins geweet nie.

As vriend en vertroueling van president Roosevelt beklee Hopkins 'n unieke magsposisie in Washington. Hy het geen formele pos in die administrasie gehad nie, maar het nog in die Withuis gewoon in die prag van Lincoln se ou studeerkamer. Sy radikalisme tydens die New Deal het hom polities geïsoleer gelaat - gehaat deur Republikeine en wantrouig deur die meeste Demokrate. Sy ongeëwenaarde toegang tot die Ovaalkantoor het die meeste lede van die kabinet bekragtig. Deur siekte gesteur, het hy nietemin 'n playboy -leefstyl gevolg wat in stryd was met die ingehoue ​​karakter van Roosevelt's White House. Ten spyte hiervan het Eleanor Roosevelt hom aanbid en hom soos 'n seun behandel.

Die eienaardigste van alles was dat Hopkins die produk was van 'n smal middel-Amerikaanse opvoeding wat hom 'n natuurlike isolasie-persoon gelaat het. Hy is gebore in Sioux City, maar het sy eerste jare in Grinnell, Iowa, deurgebring, waar hy na die universiteit gegaan het. Daar in die hart van Amerika ontwikkel die jong Hopkins sy diepgewortelde afkeer van klas en voorreg verbonde met die vermoede dat dit enigiets met Britse rooi jasse en hul ryk te doen het. Tog was dit die man, 'n onverkose Withuis met 'n diep wantroue in die "buiteland", wat die president gekies het om op die verhoog van wêrelddiplomasie te projekteer. Die rede was eenvoudig. Hopkins was die president se oë, ore en bene. Roosevelt sou niemand anders vertrou op so 'n gevaarlike en polities sensitiewe sending na Londen in 'n tyd toe die Britte 'n nederlaag in die gesig staar nie.

Na 'n bestraffende vierdaagse vlug via Brasilië, Afrika en Portugal na die suidelike kus van Engeland, het Harry Hopkins die aand van 9 Januarie in Londen aangekom om hom te midde van 'n brandaanval te bevind. Sedert die vorige September is 28 000 mense dood en 40 000 huise is vernietig in die nagtelike lugaanvalle in Londen alleen. Hy word deur die Amerikaanse ambassade, Herschel V. Johnson, in die gesig gestaar en deur strate wat in brand gesteek is, na Claridges Hotel geneem. Te midde van die oorverdowende gebrul van lugafweergewere in die nabygeleë Hyde Park, die gekerm van sirenes en die geskreeu van vallende bomme, het Hopkins aangemeld en reguit na die kroeg gegaan.

Die volgende oggend is hy saam met die premier na Downingstraat 10 gery vir middagete. In 'n brief* aan Roosevelt wat per koerier gestuur is, beskryf Hopkins die vergadering.

'N Ronde, glimlaggende, rooi gesiggie verskyn, steek 'n vet, maar nietemin oortuigende hand uit en wens my welkom in Engeland. 'N Kort swart jas, 'n gestreepte langbroek en 'n duidelike oog en sagte stem was die indruk van die leier van Engeland terwyl hy my met duidelike trotsfoto's van sy pragtige skoondogter en kleinkind wys. "

Dit was die begin van 'n eensydige hofmakery. Churchill moes 'n man wen wat sy leiding na die Withuis sou wees. Hopkins aan die ander kant het geweet dat hy die beroemde sjarme van die premier en sy redenaarsvaardighede en die feit van Churchilliaanse fantasie moes weerstaan.

By die maak van Hopkins tot sy persoonlike gesant na Londen, het Roosevelt slim isolasie -vermoedens oor die missie geneutraliseer. Die standpunt in die kongres was dat Churchill se oorlogsvernietigende retoriek weinig invloed sou hê op die seun van 'n tuigmaker wat in die Corn Belt grootgemaak is Hopkins was ook deeglik bewus van Roosevelt se eie ambivalente houding teenoor die toekoms van Brittanje en sy leier in die oorlog.

Roosevelt het nie van Churchill gehou toe hulle die eerste keer in 1918 in Londen ontmoet het en bots nie. Boonop het Churchill hom beywer vir Amerikaanse militêre steun vanaf die oomblik dat hy die vorige Mei premier geword het. Dit het Roosevelt ontstel wat uit sy pad gegaan het om die moeders van Amerika te verseker dat hul seuns nie gestuur word om in 'n ander buitelandse oorlog te veg nie.

Maar Roosevelt en sy adviseurs was ook diep ontsteld oor die vooruitsig van 'n fascistiese oorwinning in Europa. Die Lend-Lease-wetsontwerp, wat daarop gemik was om basiese voedsel en militêre hardeware aan Brittanje te verskaf, was besig om deur 'n trae kongres te gaan. Churchill wou baie meer hê. Roosevelt se militêre bevelvoerders het vir hom gesê dat daar geen nut is om voorrade na 'n land te stuur wat op die punt was om vir Hitler te kapituleer nie.

Dit was die politieke mynveld wat op Harry Hopkins in Londen wag.

Die eerste twee weke het Hopkins elke dag die eerste minister gesien en byna elke aand saam met hom geëet, hetsy in Downingstraat 10 of sy amptelike landhuis, Checkers. Hy was beïndruk deur Churchill se stygende redenasie, maar aanvanklik skepties oor moontlike Amerikaanse ingryping. Hy was ook ontsteld oor die werksomstandighede. Beide Checkers en Downingstraat 10 was warm in die bittere middel van die winter en Hopkins moes in sy oorjas werk in die enigste warm plek in die koshuis, die badkamer. Churchill hou ook daarvan om in die badkamer te werk - terwyl hy bad.

So het Hopkins probeer om aantekeninge te maak terwyl die premier te midde van wolke stoom en baie spatsels uit die bad uitsteek. Elke deur het oopgegaan vir die president se gesant. Hopkins is in kennis gestel deur topkommandante en intelligensiehoofde. Koning George VI het hom in die Buckingham -paleis ontvang. Churchill het daarop aangedring dat hy stede in die voorste linie van die blits besoek, soos Portsmouth, Southampton en Glasgow. Hopkins het tyd saam met die brandweermanne, polisie en ambulansbestuurders deurgebring wat elke aand op die strate van hierdie stede te kampe gehad het met die gruwels.

Die Amerikaanse gesant was diep beïndruk. Hy het besef dat Churchill se uitdagende toesprake en die bloedige moed van gewone mans en vroue die Britte deur hul verhoor met vuur gedra het. Uit vrees vir die blywende invloed van ambassadeur Kennedy, het Roosevelt Hopkins beveel om diplomatieke kanale te vermy en vlootkommunikasie vir sy gestuur te gebruik. Hierdeur het die president geleer dat Hopkins die mening van Churchill gedeel het dat die oorlog nie in die Engelse kanaal nie, maar in die Atlantiese Oseaan gewen of verloor sou word. Die verliese van handelaars het skerp gestyg en voedsel- en brandstofvoorrade het onder die punt van nasionale oorlewing gedaal.

Hopkins het in Engeland vyandig gestaan ​​teen enige Amerikaanse betrokkenheid by die tweede Europese oorlog in 'n generasie. Sy standpunt het vinnig verander en hy het die president aangemoedig om militêre voorrade na die Britte te stuur en vlooteenhede van die Stille Oseaan na die Atlantiese Oseaan oor te skakel om die noodsaaklike konvooie te beskerm.

In 'n brief* wat op 14 Januarie aan die Withuis geskryf is, het Hopkins gesê:

Die mense hier is ongelooflik van Churchill af en as die moed alleen kan wen, is die resultaat onvermydelik. Maar hulle het ons hulp dringend nodig en ek is seker dat u niks in die pad sal laat staan ​​nie ... hierdie eiland het nou ons hulp nodig, meneer die president, met alles wat ons hulle kan gee. ”

Dit was kragtige woorde van iemand wat Roosevelt intiem vertrou het. Maar terwyl Londen brand, het die president geweier om homself te verbind en herhaal sy nie-intervensionistiese beleid in die openbaar.

Harry Hopkins keer in die tweede week van Februarie terug na die VSA as 'n veranderde man. Hy sou daardie somer terug na Londen vlieg om die eerste oorlogsvergadering tussen Roosevelt en Churchill aan boord van hul onderskeie slagskepe aan die Newfoundland -kus te reël. Hy sou help om Churchill se besoek aan Washington oor Kersfees 1941 na Pearl Harbor aan te bied. En hy sou 'n deurslaggewende rol speel in die diplomasie tussen Rusland, Brittanje en die VSA, terwyl die bondgenote Nazi -Duitsland op sy knieë sou koop.

Maar niks het Harry Hopkins geword soos die vier weke wat hy in Januarie en Februarie 1941 in Brittanje deurgebring het nie, meestal aan Churchill se kant. Die seuntjievervaardiger se seun uit Sioux City het die vertroue van die beleërde premier gewen, het sy president gewaarsku oor die groot gevaar van Brittanje en het 'n kommunikasielyn gesmee tussen die Withuis en Downingstraat 10 wat sou lei tot 'n oorlogswinnende Atlantiese alliansie.

Met sy kenmerkende begrip van geskiedenis en liefde vir taal, noem Churchill Hopkins 'n Paladin, 'n toespeling op die ridders wat van ouds af ontsnap het wat meisies in nood gered het.

Volgens die skrywer van hierdie skrywer, het Hopkins dit en nog baie meer gedoen. Ek hoop dat my roman oor sy rol as die president se oorlogsgesant, wat gegrond is in die geskiedenis van die tydperk, mense aan weerskante van die Atlantiese Oseaan kan herinner aan sy bydrae tot die geskiedenis.

*Die Withuis se vraestelle van Harry Hopkins deur Robert E Sherwood (1948), volume 1.


Dinge het verander

Van Mei 1940 tot Februarie 1945 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt de facto minister van buitelandse sake (u kan die werklike sekretarisse ignoreer, hulle het nie beleid gemaak nie) en adviseur van die nasionale veiligheid ('n pos wat destyds nie bestaan ​​het nie) was 'n man wat geen werktitel, kantoor en huis gehad het nie en het die grootste deel van die tyd in die Withuis gewoon, 'n dobbelaar en karrousel, 'n maatskaplike werker en 'n progressiewe New Dealer, sonder voorafgaande ervaring in buitelandse beleid, in 'n haglike toestand, met driekwart van sy maag in 1937 verwyder as gevolg van kanker. 'n verminkte spysverteringskanaal, wat oorleef het deur 'n dieet van koffie, sigarette en bloedoortappings, tydens die oorlog verskeie kere in die hospitaal opgeneem het, onder meer vir 'n groot operasie in 1944, en sterf minder as ses maande na die einde van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog.

Hy was 'n man van wie Winston Churchill, het geskryf (met verwysing na hul eerste ontmoeting):

Hy was 'n man van wie die skerp en taai Amerikaanse hoof van vlootoperasies was Admiraal Ernest King (sy naam is langs die definisie van "harde gat"in die woordeboek) geskryf:

'N Man wat gevra het Generaal George C Marshall (Weermaghoof van die weermag), wat selde sy gevoelens uitgespreek het, om aan die toekomstige vrou van Hopkins te skryf en sy kommer uit te spreek dat: "Om eerlik te wees, ek is baie geïnteresseerd in Harry se gesondheid en geluk en daarom in u naderende huwelik"soos hy"is baie belangrik vir ons nasionale belange. . . en hy is een van die mees onbedagsame mense rakende sy gesondheid wat ek ooit geken het. . . Ek spreek die hoop uit dat u dit moontlik sal vind om sy indiskresies te bekamp en te sien dat hy die nodige rus neem."


'N Man wat die vertroue van die opvolger van FDR gehad het Harry Truman, wat hom groot ruimte gebied het tydens sy laaste sending na Moskou om te ontmoet Josef Stalin in Junie 1945 oor die Sowjet -onderdrukking in Pole en vir hom gesê:

Miskien kom die beste opsomming van die man vandaan Alan Brooke, die stafhoof van die Britse weermag wat berug was oor sy Amerikaanse bondgenote en berig het dat Hopkins hom eenkant toe trek om te vra om hom te ontmoet te midde van 'n bitter twis in die Withuis tussen die Britse en Amerikaanse militêre personeel:

Hierdie aanhalings is uit 'n fyn nuwe boek, The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins en die smee van die alliansie om Hitler te verslaan deur David Roll. Ek het deur die jare baie oor die Tweede Wêreldoorlog gelees en was beslis bewus van Hopkins. Hy is soos Zelig wat oral verskyn, maar ek het nooit sy rol verstaan ​​nie. Roll se boek, deur op Hopkins te fokus, maak dinge baie duideliker. Terwyl Die Hopkins Touch sy hele lewe dek, bestee Roll slegs ongeveer 10% van die boek aan sy eerste 50 jaar, met die res op sy laaste vyf jaar.

Harry Hopkins het gedurende hierdie jare die vertroueling van die FDR geword. Dit wil sê soveel as wat iemand ooit die vertroueling van so 'n ontwykende en afsydige man kan wees. FDR was berug daarvoor dat hy 'n raaiselagtige en frustrerende raaisel vir sy personeel en medewerkers was, en hy het hulle vinnig weggegooi toe hulle nut vir hom geëindig het, of hy het gevoel dat hulle hom minder as hul totale en toegewyde aandag gee. Selfs sy familieverhoudinge was gespanne. Hy het slegs 'n professionele verhouding met sy vrou, Eleanor, gehad sedert sy twintig jaar tevore sy verhouding met Lucy Mercer ontdek het (Hopkins het opgemerk dat u noukeurig moes kyk wat FDR en Eleanor in die openbaar sê, want dit was hoe hulle met mekaar kommunikeer ) en was emosioneel ver van sy volwasse kinders. Dit is geen verrassing dat FDR en Hopkins drie jaar lank gereeld alleen in die Withuis geëet het nie.

Voor 1940 was Hopkins 'n omstrede figuur in die administrasie wat as hoof van die Works Progress Administration en as sekretaris van handel gedien het. Daarvoor het hy administratiewe en organisatoriese ervaring opgedoen as leier van die Suidelike Afdeling van die Rooi Kruis en daarna as uitvoerende direkteur van die New York Tuberculosis and Health Association, wat 'n wye reeks programme vir die voorkoming en sanitasie van siektes hanteer het, wat teen 1930 drie miljoen bedien het. mense in die omgewing van New York, ervaring wat hom gehelp het toe hy die Lend-Lease-program tydens die oorlog vanuit sy slaapkamer in die Withuis bestuur het (dinge het toe 'n bietjie anders gewerk).

Volgens Roll het Hopkins sy nuwe rol ingetrek omdat hy 'n leemte in Roosevelt se lewe gevul het. FDR het gevoel dat Hopkins beter as enigiemand anders weet wat hy in gedagte het, selfs al word dit nie direk uitgespreek nie. Hy het Harry se verhale en sin vir humor geniet, en hulle het ook gebind as gevolg van hul fisiese gestremdhede. Soos Roll dit stel "elkeen was afhanklik van afhanklikheid, selfs al het hulle op die oomblik tot afhanklikheid gedwing"en Robert Sherwood (wat in die administrasie gedien het en 'n boek geskryf het oor die verhouding tussen FDR en Hopkins) het geskryf"daar het 'n spesiale band tussen Roosevelt en Hopkins ontstaan, omdat beide mans op kort afstand met die dood geveg het, het hulle gelewe op geleende tyd".

Die boek neem ons deur die kritiese maneuver in 1940 en 1941, terwyl FDR besluit om Brittanje te help terwyl hy nie die oorlog betree nie (namate Hopkins meer oortuig word dat die VSA 'n vegter moet word) en dan die totstandkoming van die Grand Alliance met Brittanje en die Sowjet Unie in 1942 en 1943.

Hopkins was intiem betrokke by besluitneming vanaf 1940 (in Mei van daardie jaar het Vannevar Bush met Hopkins vergader om sy steun te kry in 'n projek om Amerikaanse wetenskaplikes by die ontwikkeling van die wapens te werf, gebaseer op die jongste ontdekkings oor die atoom wat die president ingestem het om te baseer op aanbeveling van Harry), maar die kern van die boek is die tien reise en konferensies waarin Hopkins gedurende 1941, 1942 en 1943 'n belangrike rol gespeel het. Churchill en die bereidwilligheid van die Britte om voort te gaan en geen vrede met Hitler te onderhandel nie (sien 'n lys van die ander reise onderaan hierdie pos). Op hierdie stadium het Brittanje alleen gestaan ​​teen Duitsland wat die kontinent oorheers het en die Sowjetunie as die belangrikste verskaffer van oorlogsmateriaal gehad het en die Engelse oral verloor het (sien Churchill styg op en Londen bel vir meer inligting oor hierdie tydperk). Hopkins se mening was van kritieke belang om te besluit of hy die vloedgolf oorlogsvoorrade wat deur die Britte aangevra word, moet verskaf. Die Amerikaanse weermag was huiwerig om dit te doen, want elke skip, vliegtuig en ammunisie wat na Engeland gestuur is, was een minder vir die VSA, wat vinnig besig was om sy militêre magte op te bou en as Brittanje sou oorgee, sou al die materiaal verlore gaan en miskien selfs teen Amerika gebruik word.

Harry Hopkins, die progressiewe maatskaplike werker en hervormer, was nie gunstig geneig tot die aristokratiese konserwatiewe Winston Churchill voor sy besoek nie, maar hulle het dit dadelik in hul eerste ontmoeting, 'n drie-uur-een-op-middagete, geslaan. Hopkins het daarna 'n lid van die Britse kabinet opgemerk, 'Jesus Christus! Wat 'n man!"Tydens sy besoek van drie weke het Hopkins sy tyd alleen saam met Churchill deurgebring, waaronder naweke by sy gesinshuis, Chartwell, en 'n hegte verhouding gesmee wat deur die hele oorlog voortgeduur het. Soos een biograaf van Churchill opgemerk het"Hopkins het vinnig 'n persoonlike posisie in die Churchill -hof verkry".

Hopkins het oortuig geraak dat die Britte sou aanhou veg en het FDR geskryf "Hierdie eiland het ons hulp nou nodig, meneer die president, met alles wat ons kan kry". Vir die Britte was die beste herinnering van die reis tydens 'n ete in Glasgow met 'n groot deel van die kabinet toe Churchill Hopkins gevra het om 'n paar woorde te sê.

Roll wys daarop dat hierdie verklaring van eksplisiete ondersteuning die instruksies van FDR oorskry het en destyds 'n opskudding sou veroorsaak het as dit in die VSA bekend geword het, maar die effek was elektries tydens die aandete. Lord Moran (dokter van Churchill) het geskryf dat die premier tot trane gereduseer is "Hy het geweet wat dit beteken. Selfs vir ons het die woorde soos 'n tou na 'n drenkeling gelyk".

By hierdie besoek het Hopkins 'n noue verhouding met die hele Churchill -gesin ontwikkel, en hy was baie gemaklik om die premier te terg. Winston se vrou, Clementine, wat dikwels baie kritiek op die politieke medewerkers van haar man was, het haar dogter geskryf, 'betower deur hom". Churchill se skoondogter het van Hopkins geskryf dat"hy sou 'n Scotch hê"maar"dit lyk asof ek nooit iets eet nie"en dat hy kyk:

In die volgende drie jaar was Hopkins die kern van die belangrikste strategiese kwessies oor hoe die oorlog gevoer moes word. Die kwessie wat die gesprekke tussen FDR en Churchill en tussen die Amerikaanse en Britse weermag oorheers het, was toe die opening van die Tweede Front via 'n landing in Frankryk sou plaasvind, besprekings waarin Stalin sy bondgenote geëier het deur die front te eis sodra moontlik.

Omdat die Britte bedag was op die bloedstorting aan die Wesfront en by Gallipoli in die Eerste Wêreldoorlog, was die Britte huiwerig om 'n frontaanval in Frankryk te onderneem. FDR was bekommerd dat as die Amerikaanse troepe nie vinnig teen Duitsland in aksie sou kom nie, die publiek sou eis dat hulle ondanks die Japannese gebruik sou word, soos bespreek in Die dag na Pearl Harbor, die besluit van Amerikaanse en Britse leiers om die oorlog teen die Nazi's die hoogste prioriteit te maak. Generaal Marshall wou hê dat 'n eerste landing in Frankryk in September 1942 gemaak moet word en weerstaan ​​die Britse pogings om aksies in die Middellandse See te bevorder, en sodra die besluit geneem is vir die Noord -Afrikaanse landings in November 1942, het hy sonder sukses die landings van Sicilië en Italië in 1943 weerstaan. wat gelei het tot die uitstel van die Franse landings tot Junie 1944. FDR en Hopkins beland, na vele kinkels, saam met die Britte, maar in Teheran in November 1943, toe Churchill nog probeer wegglip van 'n invasieverbintenis van 1944 wat hulle uiteindelik vasgemaak hom. Today, most military historians agree that postponing the invasion until 1944 was the right move as the American and British forces did not have the overwhelming strength in resources and lacked fighting experience in 1942 and 1943 which made chances of success much more questionable.

Hopkins played an essential role in all of these often heated discussions. Lees The Hopkins Touch, I was left with the impression that while Hopkins was carrying out FDR's wishes there were times when he seems to almost take on the role of neutral mediator between the Americans and the British. His ability to know when to push an issue and when not to and how to talk with people is uncanny and he would stand up to FDR. At one meeting with the President in which Marshall protested an agreement FDR made with Churchill and threatened to resign, Hopkins took Marshall's side and persuaded FDR to go back to the Prime Minister and tell him he had changed his mind. In fact, a common theme of the book is the constant worry of FDR's subordinates about his susceptibility to Churchill's powers of persuasion and their reliance on Hopkins to prevent the worst from happening. Hopkins role in this respect was not limited to the Americans. In one instance, Hopkins interceded with Churchill to get him to back down from disrupting a delicate agreement reached between the two nations' military chiefs for which Brooke thanked him.

Roll does a terrific job capturing the personalities, strategic issues and disputes in an understandable way. He also tackles FDR's misconceptions about the Soviets and specifically, Stalin (which were shared by Hopkins both felt the American and Soviet systems would, in some mysterious way, converge over time). Chip Bohlen, a Soviet State Department specialist, said of Hopkins that "Harry was inclined to dismiss ideology" and the same can be said of FDR. The President was convinced that his personal charm would allow him to develop a relationship with Stalin that would last into the post-war world. This was an enormous miscalculation about a man who was ideologically driven and as cold, brutal, cunning and cynical as Hitler (see, for instance The Court Of The Red Tsar by Simon Sebag Montefiore). It is very clear from Roll and everything else I've read that U.S. policy towards Stalin was driven by the President and not his advisers or the State Department. On occasion, Hopkins indicated more of a sense of realism about the Soviets and, according to Bohlen, on the return flight from Moscow after his mission to Stalin in June 1945, Hopkins expressed "serious doubts as to the possibility of genuine collaboration with the Soviet Union", predicting that the "American belief in freedom might lead to serious differences".

However, as a practical matter, FDR's failure to realistically assess Stalin had relatively little impact on the course of the war which was driven more by the facts on the ground. Poland and Eastern Europe were going to end up under Soviet domination regardless of whether FDR miscalculated or not because the Soviet Army got there first.

One of the things that the book conveys were the difficulties of communication and travel. Compared to today's world with the Internet, Skype and jet planes, the 1940s seem like an ancient land. Flights were slow and roundabout and every sea voyage was a serious undertaking (and, of course, the Nazis might attack you in the process). This was particularly trying on Hopkins whose health was always precarious. The worst was his trip from England to Moscow in July 1941 for his first meeting with Stalin.

The flight to Russia was 21 hours nonstop in the cold, unheated cabin of a small Catalina airboat with Hopkins jammed into the Plexiglass tail blister, which was equipped with a machine gun. Because of headwinds the return trip took more than 24 hours. Both coming and going there were several aborted takeoffs and landings on choppy seas. On his return to England, a critically ill Hopkins was given blood transfusions and sedated, sleeping eighteen hours.

The Hopkins Touch reinforces what I've read in other accounts about how the day after day pressures, pace of work and scale of decision making, which continued for years, took a toll on the leaders of the Allied efforts. While FDR and Hopkins faced disabilities prior to the war, there is no doubt that these pressures contributed to their early deaths. 1944 was a turning point for both of them. In early 1944, voor he decided to seek reelection, FDR was diagnosed with congestive heart failure and many who had not seen him for awhile remarked on how shocked they were at his evident physical and mental deterioration during his last year. For Hopkins, it was the surgery at the Mayo Clinic he underwent in a vain attempt to improve his digestive system's ability to absorb nutrients - surgery that he never really recovered from. They weren't alone - Churchill's physician wrote of his physical decline during the last years of the war and the memoirs and biographies of the military leaders are replete with references to physical collapses and hospitalizations.

And it wasn't only the leaders and the soldiers on the front lines who suffered from these pressures. In a new book about America's remarkable wartime industrial mobilization, Freedom's Forge, Arthur Herman writes that the death and injury rate for war-related industrial production workers in 1942 and 1943 was twenty times the combat casualty rate for American servicemen during the same period.

Another example of these pressures is that the need to quickly build up a huge Air Force and train crews led to about 10,000 servicemen dying in training and transport accidents within the territorial United States, including, most famously, a B-25 bomber lost in the fog crashing into the upper floors of the Empire State gebou.

On a lighter note, The Hopkins Touch has the added attraction of reminding us of Winston Churchill's ornate rhetoric (see, also A Lesson In Rhetoric) and unique lifestyle. From a note he sent to FDR in November 1940:

And his instructions to the White House butler during his December 1941 visit:

Although this has been a very long post, it covers only a fraction of the many fascinating aspects of Hopkins' work described in The Hopkins Touch. Harry Hopkins was a man who gave all he had to give for his country, including one of his sons, a Marine killed by the Japanese on Kwajalein Atoll in February 1944.


OTHER TRIPS AND CONFERENCES OF HARRY HOPKINS (1941-3)

July 13-August 4, 1941: Visit to London for meetings with Churchill and British military. In the middle a trip to Moscow to meet with Stalin less than a month after the German invasion began.

August 4-12, 1941: The Newfoundland "Atlantic Charter" meeting, the first time Roosevelt and Churchill met since WWI and starting with a small dinner party consisting of FDR, the Prime Minister and Hopkins.

December 22, 1941-January 14, 1942: Churchill comes to Washington DC with his military staff in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor to decide on common military strategy.

April 4-19, 1942: Hopkins and Gen Marshall go to London to discuss the Second Front.

July 18-26, 1942: Hopkins, Marshall and Admiral King go to London to discuss the Second Front and invasion of North Africa.

January 11-24, 1943: Casablanca Conference between Churchill and FDR

May 5-20, 1943: Churchill in the U.S. for strategy discussions.

August 17-30, 1943: Quebec Conference. FDR and Churchill.

November 13- December 16, 1943: First and second Cairo conferences between Churchill and FDR and Tehran Conference with Stalin.


Inhoud

Social worker

Harry Lloyd Hopkins was born in Sioux City, Iowa, the fourth child of David Aldona and Anna (née Pickett) Hopkins, devout Methodist parents who taught him the Social Gospel. He attended Grinnell College and soon after his graduation in 1912 took a job with Christodora House, a social settlement in New York City's Lower East Side ghetto. In the spring of 1913 he accepted a position with the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor (AICP) as "friendly visitor" and superintendent of the Employment Bureau. In October 1913, Harry Hopkins married Ethel Gross and the couple eventually had three sons: David (1914-1980), Robert (1921-2007) and Stephen (1925-1944).

In 1915, New York City's Democratic Mayor John Purroy Mitchel appointed Hopkins executive secretary of the Bureau of Child Welfare which administered pensions to mothers with dependent children.

In 1917 with the nation's entry into World War I, Hopkins became the American Red Cross director of Civilian Relief, Gulf Division. Eventually, the Gulf Division of the Red Cross merged with the Southwestern Division and Hopkins, headquartered now in Atlanta, was appointed general manager in 1921. Hopkins helped draft a charter for the American Association of Social Workers (AASW) and was elected its president in 1923.

In 1922, Hopkins returned to New York City where he became general director of the New York Tuberculosis Association. During his tenure, the agency grew enormously and absorbed the New York Heart Association.

When the Great Depression hit, New York State Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt called on Hopkins to run the first state relief organization in the nation – the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration (TERA). Hopkins and Eleanor Roosevelt began a long friendship, which strengthened his role in relief programs.

Personal life

Hopkins married as a young man a fellow welfare worker. Hulle het drie seuns gehad. In 1930 his wife filed suit against him for divorce in New York State, the charge being infidelity. She secured the divorce and an order for the payment of $5,000 a year in alimony. Hopkins was making $10,000 a year at the time. Shortly after the divorce, he took a second wife. He became WPA Administrator at a salary of $10,000 a year. Marquis W. Childs, in an article in the Saturday Evening Post of April 19 and 26, 1941, said Hopkins was hard pressed for funds under the circumstances and was having a difficult time meeting the alimony payments to his first wife. To cure this situation, social workers were brought together to raise a fund of $5,000 a year to take care of Hopkins' alimony. A number of small salaried little social welfare workers were assessed to pay Hopkins' obligation to support his children. In theory the money was collected to pay him for lectures. This arrangement went on for two years. Then in January, 1936, his salary was raised to $12,000 and the welfare workers were relieved of the burden of Hopkins' alimony.

Childs relates in the same article, that during those WPA days, Hopkins, who was so pressed for funds was, with the men around him, playing poker with losses so stiff they ran to $500 or $600 an evening and that he found the time and the means to spend weekends in the homes wealthy friends and to make frequent visits to the race tracks at Saratoga, Pimlico and Warrenton. Life magazine has printed much the same stories about him.

According to Mr. Felix Belair in an article in Lewe, Postmaster General Walker, John D. Hertz, and other millionaire friends, raised a purse to pay Hopkins $5,000 a year as head of Franklin D. Roosevelt's library at Hyde Park. When the Lend Lease act was voted the President arranged a $10,000 a year salary for Hopkins under the Lend Lease program. During this period Tom Beck, the head of the CrowellCollier Publishing Company, began paying him $5,000 a piece for seven or eight articles in the American Magazine over a period of several years for articles written in Hopkins name. In the meantime, he had moved into the White House where he enjoyed the additional privilege of free board and lodging. His second wife had died and his daughter by this marriage lived with him in the White House. When Hopkins and his third wife later moved to Georgetown, his daughter, after remaining with them a while, went back to the White House. Mrs. Roosevelt writes how she fretted about the lonely life of this child and spoke to Hopkins about it. He said to her: "That's totally unimportant. The only thing that is important is to win the war." He found plenty of time, however, to pursue at intervals his favorite forms of diversions in the night clubs of New York and Washington.


Harry Hopkins, Soviet agent

As a law student in the late 1940s, I became fascinated with the revelations of Communist penetration of American society, including Soviet espionage against the U.S. government. The sworn testimony of former spy couriers Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley made it plain at least to me that hundreds of highly placed American citizens had betrayed their country to advance the cause and ultimate victory of the Soviet Union.
That conviction, which was shared by millions of my fellow Americans, resulted in the ferocious controversy that divided the country for more than a decade after the end of World War II, as the Cold War began. As the situation escalated with the conviction of Alger Hiss, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for perjury in denying that he had been a Soviet spy, the battle seemed to sway in our favor. But the liberals, dreading the charge that they had ignored the peril, counterattacked, turning Wisconsin Sen. Joseph McCarthy into an all-purpose villain who allegedly smeared innocent victims with groundless charges of communism or pro-communism, and gradually the tide turned. By the end of the 1950s the battle was over, and it seemed clear that the “anti-anti-communists” had won.
What no one but a few intelligence professionals knew was that in the early 1940s our government had recorded thousands of coded messages from Soviet agents in Washington and New York to their Moscow superiors, and in the ensuing years they had managed to decode many of them. These messages clearly demonstrated that our side in the great controversy was right. Alger Hiss had indeed been a Soviet spy, as charged. So had Julius Rosenberg and scores of others.
Yet for reasons still not explained, this enormously important information was withheld from the American public until a few short years ago, when Sen. Daniel Moynihan, New York Democrat, insisted that the damning documents be declassified. Under their code name, “The Venona Papers” are now available to everyone through the Library of Congress.
To read these dispatches from Moscow’s top spies is to glimpse the scope and success of their efforts, and the priceless help they received from hundreds of American traitors. As a guide to them, one cannot do better than to read “The Venona Secrets” (Regnery 2000), a new book by Herbert Romerstein and the late Eric Breindel.
Nearly 50 years have passed since this controversy was at a boil, and at least 60 since Soviet espionage was at its peak, so it is hardly surprising that there are many millions of Americans to whom even the name Alger Hiss is utterly meaningless. But there are still many people alive who can remember when the chief confidant of President Franklin Roosevelt was a man named Harry Hopkins. And they will be understandably astonished to learn that in a message dated May 29, 1943, Iskhak Akhmerov, the chief Soviet “illegal” agent in the United States at the time, referred to an Agent 19 who had reported on discussions between Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in Washington at which the agent had been present. Only Harry Hopkins meets the requirements for this agent’s identity. Small wonder that Akhmerov, in a lecture in Moscow in the early 1960s, identified Hopkins by name as “the most important of all Soviet wartime agents in the United States.”
It took 50 years to bludgeon Alger Hiss’ defenders into admitting that this suave bureaucrat, who rose to be chief of the State Department’s Office of Special Political Affairs, had actually been a Soviet agent all along. And it will probably take another 50 to force Franklin Roosevelt’s admirers to concede that their hero’s closest confidant and adviser was yet another Soviet agent.
But the documents and the testimony are now on the public record, and they make it plain that those of us who sounded the warning about Soviet espionage and policy subversion 50 years ago didn’t know the half of it.
“The Venona Secrets” contains much else that will shock those too young to remember these ancient battles. And for those of us who do remember, it is comforting evidence that the truth, however belatedly, has a way of coming out.

William Rusher is a distinguished fellow of the Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy.


Work History

FDR created millions of jobs in just a few months' time, but the same feat would be impossible today.

In the autumn of 1933, Harry Hopkins was worried about the coming winter. Since May, he had served in Franklin Roosevelt's administration as head of the federal government's new -- in fact, its first -- program to distribute funds to the unemployed. Neither unemployment insurance nor food stamps nor welfare had yet come into existence. Only a handful of states had relief programs, and they were rapidly going broke. And private charity was almost laughably inadequate to the problems of a nation where unemployment stood close to 25 percent.

Hopkins feared that millions of Americans would be without food or shelter in the coming cold months. In October, he met with the president and proposed something new: a temporary federal jobs program to see the nation through the winter. It would employ 4 million people and last for four months. Roosevelt did a quick calculation, figured it would cost $400 million, and decided to take that money from the budget of the Public Works Administration, run by his secretary of the interior, Harold Ickes.

In time, the PWA would build such enduring monuments as the Bonneville and Boulder dams, the Triborough and Oakland Bay bridges, and the carriers Onderneming en Yorktown, which ended Japan's advance across the Pacific at the Battle of Midway. But the PWA was slow to get up and running. As Roosevelt himself later wrote, the delay was the result "of the unavoidable time-consuming process of planning, designing and reviewing projects, clearing up legal matters, advertising for bids and letting contracts." Hopkins, as Roosevelt was fully aware, intended to short-circuit those processes -- indeed, to skip them altogether. It wasn't Management 101, but, as Hopkins frequently pointed out, "Hunger is not debatable."

What happened next was astounding -- by the standards of 1933 and, for that matter, of 2010. Indeed, Hopkins' initiative and ambition should be a model for our response to today's Great Recession. Hopkins' program, the Civil Works Administration (CWA), began operating on Nov. 9. He summoned governors and mayors to meet with him in Washington on Nov. 15 and submit proposals to put people to work. As the proposals came in, he approved them: 122 on Nov. 20, 109 on Nov. 21. By Nov. 26, he had approved 920 projects for Indiana alone, and 48,500 Indianans were already on the job, on the CWA's payroll, by that day.

"Ickes was concerned about the return on the taxpayers' investment," Robert Sherwood writes in his 1948 biography Roosevelt and Hopkins. "Hopkins did not give a damn about the return his approach was that of a social worker who was interested only in getting relief to the miserable and getting it there quickly."

By Christmas, the CWA was employing 2.6 million Americans. A few weeks later, Congress appropriated an additional $950 million, funding the expansion of the program to encompass a total of 4,264,000 workers. Thirteen million Americans had been unemployed at the start of November by early February, that figure had dropped to 9 million.

The overwhelming majority of CWA jobs were laborers' jobs, requiring the use of shovels and pickaxes. CWA workers repaired streets, built playgrounds, and paved airport runways and roads connecting farms to market. Another 50,000 of the workers on CWA payrolls were teachers, and 3,000 were artists and writers. In their four months on the job, the CWA's workers paved 255,000 miles of roads, built or improved 40,000 schools and 998 airports, and painted the San Francisco cityscape murals (including a scene of a library prominently featuring works by Marx and Lenin) on the inside of Coit Tower.

Putting millions of people to work in a space of two months was an amazing achievement. The 4.26 million Americans employed by the CWA constituted roughly 3.5 percent of the nation's population of 125 million people. Today, the Census Bureau estimates that America is home to 309 million. If a modern-day public-works program were employed on the same scale, it would employ 10.8 million Americans. Since the current recession began, the United States has lost 8.4 million jobs and failed to add the additional 2.7 million jobs it would need to hold unemployment steady due to population growth. In short, the nation needs to create 11.1 million jobs to get back to pre-recession levels.

If a new Harry Hopkins heading a new CWA were to come along, employing the same percentage of Americans that the old Hopkins and the old CWA employed, in just a few short months the recession would be over. But so far the Obama administration has failed to put such a program in place. And if, as many economists fear, the private sector fails to create many new jobs even as the recession ends, then New Deal?style public-jobs programs remain an option -- perhaps, the only option -- to return America to anything resembling full employment.

barack 0bama came to the presidency with long-standing plans to create universal health coverage and to slow global warming. But neither he nor the Democratic Party -- nor anyone, for that matter -- had a plan for how to remedy the most serious economic meltdown since the Great Depression no one had anticipated the calamitous near-collapse of American finance. Then again, the collapse of the American economy was not something Roosevelt or anyone during the boom years of the 1920s had anticipated, either.

Yet in dealing with both economic depression and war, Roosevelt demonstrated a stunning ability to improvise and mobilize, to create programs unlike any the nation had seen before and bring them to epochal scale in a relatively short time. In dealing with the current recession, by contrast, Obama has not had to invent policies from whole cloth. He and his advisers know the lessons of Roosevelt's presidency and Keynesian economics that is why he pushed a $787 billion stimulus program through Congress shortly after he took office. But while the stimulus clearly saved jobs (an estimated 1.5 million to 2 million in 2009), chiefly in the public sector, it was insufficient to stop the cutbacks in state and local governments and unable to keep the level of private-sector joblessness from rising. There is no latter-day equivalent of the CWA or the WPA (the Works Progress Administration, the public-jobs program, headed by Hopkins, that ran from 1935 until 1943).

There are complex reasons why we have not built 21st--century versions of these job programs. For one thing, political resistance to such policies is higher today than it was 75 years ago -- in part because today's misery is less acute, since the nation now has programs such as unemployment insurance and food stamps. America lacks the sense of existential crisis that it experienced in the depths of the Depression. Also, a resurgent American right, panicked by Obama's ascent to the presidency, has stepped up its war against government initiatives. Its efforts have been augmented by those of the deficit-phobes, who have dominated public discourse at the worst possible moment for a nation in need of all the economic stimulus it can get.

Because of this opposition, the $1.2 trillion stimulus proposal that Christina Romer, head of Obama's Council of Economic Advisers, was going to present to the president didn't even reach his desk. Romer was convinced that anything smaller than her proposed stimulus would fail to stanch the economic bleeding. The president's political aides, however, deemed it too high to be enacted, and economic policy chief Larry Summers believed it would induce panic about its impact on the federal deficit.

In the end, the stimulus package cut payroll taxes, provided more funds for unemployment insurance, gave significant aid to state governments (particularly to keep Medicaid recipients from losing their benefits), and devoted a smaller amount of funds -- but still a lot of money -- for public works. Anti--government ideology and misplaced deficit phobia took their toll on the size and character of the stimulus package, but they do not explain why so much of the stimulus has failed to bolster the economy -- particularly those parts of the economy, such as infrastructure construction, that we associate with the New Deal's jobs programs.

The real culprit wasn't underfunding or lack of political will. It was poor implementation. The White House hasn't made the massive push that's required to overcome the normal inertia of government. And matters are complicated by the checks that liberals created to keep the government from building roads, rails, and other infrastructure by executive fiat.

"I kept hearing that we had lots of projects that were shovel-ready," says one administration official. "But they weren't. We have think tanks that make a compelling case for Keynesian stimulus. What we need, it turns out, is a think tank that tells us how to actually do a stimulus -- how we can get the dollars out there now" to reduce unemployment.

Much of the stimulus money, to be sure, flowed to its beneficiaries without encountering any bottlenecks at all. The reduction in payroll taxes almost immediately boosted workers' paychecks. The additional funds for unemployment insurance and food stamps went straight to their recipients. The aid to state governments enabled those governments to keep people on the Medicaid rolls and to substantially limit the layoffs of teachers and other public employees.

What the funds haven't done is boost employment in the two sectors that have hemorrhaged the most jobs: construction (where unemployment stands at 24.9 percent) and manufacturing (where it's at 12.6 percent). The latter sector suffers from special problems, because it now is subject to global competition and must await the return of the American consumer's purchasing power. But construction is the sector that first comes to mind as the object of a public-jobs program -- in part the result of the hold that the New Deal job programs have on our historic consciousness.

To gauge what actually happens -- and doesn't happen -- when stimulus money is sent to a state, let's look at California. The recession has been particularly devastating for the once-Golden State. In February, its unemployment rate stood at 12.5 percent, while the national rate was 9.7 percent. As the Southern California exurban housing boom -- fueled by sub-prime mortgages -- has shuddered to a halt, unemployment in the state's construction sector has soared to nearly 30 percent.

America's mega-state is the targeted beneficiary of $85 billion of the $787 billion stimulus package (that's 10.8 percent of the total the state is home to 12 percent of America's population). Funds that went to existing government aid programs reached their California recipients fairly quickly. In 2009, federal stimulus dollars supplanted the state's waning contributions to its Medicaid program, enabling the state to maintain coverage for more than 190,000 children, according to a report from the nonpartisan California Budget Project. The stimulus awarded $8.2 billion to the state to help with Medicaid for a two-year period, and by the end of 2009, $4.7 billion of it had been spent for that purpose. Another $1.4 billion was allotted to California beneficiaries of food stamps for a two-year period, and half that amount, $705 million, was spent in 2009. A further $4.8 billion was provided to the state for K-12 and higher education. Facing massive cutbacks in public schools and universities, the state spent $4 billion of that to keep classrooms open and teachers on the job.

But many stimulus programs are long-range and will take years to implement. California is set to receive an estimated $1.9 billion, for instance, in federal funding to develop a health information-exchange infrastructure, including electronic record-keeping. But such programs take time to develop. By the end of 2009, no funds had yet been awarded to California.

The real problem, however, is that some programs that aren't supposed to be long-range are turning out that way. The New Deal?type programs in the stimulus come chiefly in the form of grants from the departments of Energy and Transportation -- and these have been the slowest to be implemented. California received $620 million in weatherization and energy-efficiency dollars in 2009 but by year's end had spent just $6.7 million of that. The state received $2.3 billion for intercity high-speed rail, but the construction of such projects could take decades.

The disparity in the speed at which different projects get going is evident in the state's own tally of jobs funded through the stimulus dollars. By the end of 2009, stimulus money had funded 50,138 jobs in education but just 1,656 in transportation. Totaling all infrastructure spending in the stimulus, $10.6 billion was slated to come to California, $5.6 billion had been awarded, and just $1.2 billion spent by the end of last year.

Wat het gebeur? Big government -- spending, that is -- ran into good government -- regulation, competitive bidding, environmental safeguards, the works. "To be shovel-ready is much more complicated now than it was in 1933," says Laura Chick, the former Los Angeles city controller (and a liberal Democrat) whom Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger appointed as the state's inspector general of stimulus spending. "Environmental-impact reviews, historic-preservation safeguards, unionization of government workers -- these are good things, but they've changed the way government can operate. Plus which, the federal government said, 'We'll give you a ton of money, and we want you to spend it faster -- and better.' There are no exemptions from regulations that came with the stimulus funds. They didn't waive the requirement for competitive bidding they stressed competitive bidding."

She continues, "You can't just build a new bridge. You've got to do environmental-impact reports, you have to open up the decision to community input, you face potential lawsuits. I'm not saying concern for environmental impacts should go away, but it makes it harder to deal with an economic crisis."

Chick rolls off a litany of speed bumps. The federal government wanted community-based organizations in poor urban communities to undertake home-weatherization projects. But many organizations couldn't pay the federally mandated prevailing wages for construction work or meet the increased reporting standards that Washington mandated. Weatherization work in Los Angeles almost ground to a halt.

There have also been instances where federal spending and state cutbacks have collided. Chick discovered that many projects were stalled in the state's Office of Historic Preservation, which needs to sign off on myriad construction or modernization endeavors. As a result of Schwarzenegger's budget cuts and the furloughs for state workers, Chick found it was taking 60 days for the chronically understaffed office to get to and approve the most routine structural improvements.

Even when there are no extraordinary bottlenecks, things proceed slowly. "We got $25 million of the $256 million in Department of Energy (DOE) grants to the state Energy Commission to make 250 state office buildings more energy-efficient," says Scott Harvey, the chief deputy director of California's Department of General Services. "We do competitive bidding for the jobs. We've needed interagency agreements. We spent a lot of time figuring out how to calculate the number of jobs this would generate that required a lot of give-and-take between us and the DOE." To date, of the $25 million, only $5.4 million has gone out to contractors.

There's a further difference between today's infrastructure work and that of the New Deal: It's much more productive, and hence employs fewer people. "The work itself has changed since the '30s -- or the '60s," says Robert Balgenorth, president of the state AFL-CIO's Building and Construction Trades Council. An electrician, Balgenorth built high schools during the 1960s. "It took 15 to 20 electricians to build a high school then," he says. "It takes four or five today. Stuff that we had to assemble then comes pre-assembled today." Heavy equipment has changed as well. "You can haul more in bigger trucks today," he says. "You need fewer drivers."

And yet, some of these constraints were around in Roosevelt's day, too. The great projects of the PWA proceeded, at Ickes' insistence, with painstaking deliberation and constant fiscal oversight. Ickes required states and localities to come up with 55 percent of the funding for projects, which slowed things down even more. Hopkins made no such demands in 1936, state and local governments covered just 9.8 percent of the WPA's costs.

Roosevelt had Hopkins create and run the CWA and then the WPA because he knew Hopkins would pay no heed to fiscal and procedural strictures. The work would be simple the labor, cheap. The average monthly wage for WPA workers was $82 for PWA workers (more likely to be skilled craftsmen), it was $330. While the PWA was building the Oakland Bay Bridge, the WPA in Oakland was engaged in rat control, book repairs at libraries, park improvements, painting schools, and hacking away underbrush to create fire trails. There was no competitive bidding for these projects, no means test for workers, and not much in the way of skills requirements.

And therein lies the problem with Obama's stimulus package: To the extent that it follows in Roosevelt's footsteps, it doesn't really re-create the WPA at all. It re-creates the PWA -- a far smaller program than the WPA in the number of people it employed and a far slower program to get up and running. Re--creating the WPA would require a sense of economic emergency so urgent that it would overcome not just the bureaucratic inertia common to much of government but also the conservative objections to more government spending, and the liberal objections to short-circuiting some of the safeguards erected against quick and large-scale infrastructure projects.

That doesn't mean liberals must go down the same road to countercyclical economics that China has, unhampered by the procedural, environmental, and democratic constraints that Americans take for granted. But these are not normal or healthy times, and liberals should exercise a preferential option for the tens of millions of unemployed Americans (particularly since their plight is not likely to be lifted through the normal workings of the economy), for reasons both of compassion and nation-building here at home.

Recently, Rep. George Miller of California, the chair of the House Education and Labor Committee, introduced a stimulus bill of his own, which would allocate roughly $100 billion to state governments, still facing massive cutbacks, to save the jobs of their teachers, nurses, cops, and firefighters. It's a necessary measure, but it doesn't address the continuing crisis in the manufacturing and construction sectors. Blue-collar men constitute 57 percent of the Americans who've lost jobs in this recession blue-collar white men (who are 11 percent of the work force and 36 percent of the unemployed) are the group whose support for Obama and the Democrats, by the evidence of the polls, has fallen the furthest.

The way that the government can create the most jobs in the least time, however, is to create them in the home-care, child-care, and preschool industries. A February study from the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College found that a $50 billion investment in these industries would generate 1.2 million new jobs, while the same $50 billion applied to infrastructure would yield just 556,000 jobs. The case for such an investment is both economic and moral -- the beneficiaries would disproportionately be low-wage women of color -- but given the state of American politics today, the political obstacles to enacting such a program would be major. Only if it were linked to programs creating more construction jobs would it even be conceivable -- and only barely at that.

What the nation needs economically, then, and what Obama needs politically, is a jobs bill that invests in home care and child care, boosts tax credits for domestic manufacturing (this is, in fact, the subject of one White House proposal), and hurls money into infrastructure spending (the kind of spending that Republicans oppose least). Obama then needs his own Harry Hopkins. The new Hopkins won't be able to dispense funds as quickly as the original, but he must convey the urgency and zeal for cutting red tape that Hopkins brought to the New Deal's job programs.

The heaviest lift, however, remains Obama's. The globalization (and the attendant overcapacity) of production and the long-term effects of the financial crisis mean that the manufacturing and construction sectors, which have provided decent-paying jobs to millions of workers and economic vibrancy to the nation, aren't likely to recover on their own. Obama needs to talk to Americans about the constrained economic future they will face if those sectors don't revive, as well as the benefits of more early childhood education and senior care -- and why the nation needs a massive government commitment to those sectors to recapture its economic vibrancy.

With the enactment of health-care reform, Democrats now insist they have turned their focus to jobs, jobs, jobs. Saying so but not doing so will only bring down the wrath of the electoral gods. However arduous the task, they need to find their way to build a new WPA.


Why Does it Matter?

I realize the question of whether Hopkins was a “dupe” or “agent of influence” inside the White House 80 years ago will strike some as the essence of esoteric. However, as I learned the hard way, after presenting in “ American Betrayal” a portrait of Hopkins that builds on the research of Romerstein and others, that this man’s eternal innocence is a precious, vital mythology for academia’s cabal, and woe to anyone who dares dispute it.

Hoekom? In part, it may come down to this: If Americans judge the evidence for themselves and conclude, like Romerstein and others, that Hopkins was an agent of Soviet influence, his central role in FDR’s administration—first, in bringing the socialist revolution we know as the “New Deal,” and, later, the disastrous decision-making that seems to have prolonged the fighting in World War II, thus enabling the communists to occupy half of Europe and later seize China—appears in a new and terrible light.

Everything we have been taught, not only about FDR and World War II, but also about the Cold War and the “American Century,” is suddenly upended. Even our conception of ourselves starts to unravel.

This is bad juju—at least, for the Swamp, which perpetuates “court history” to ennoble itself. It is, however, good—if bitter—medicine for the cause of honesty, repair, and reconstruction of the American republic.

Might Kengor have shifted his Hopkins assessment because of the emergence of new evidence that neutralizes Romerstein’s case? If so, I have yet to see it. In fact, all that erupted from “the professors” in response to my own brief against Hopkins—for example, Hopkins warning the Soviet Embassy that the FBI was eavesdropping on communist agents engaged in atomic espionage sworn testimony that Hopkins sent embargoed uranium to Moscow in the midst of the Manhattan Project Hopkins urging FDR to return the important defector Victor Kravchenko to the Soviets (just like Soviet Ambassador Andrey Gromyko, Hopkins chillingly referred to Kravchenko as a “deserter”) and much more—were toxic clouds of disinformation, not facts.

When Romerstein died in 2013, Kengor wrote a warm appreciation of his exceptional scholarship and real-life communist investigations for Congress. Ironically, Kengor met Romerstein in 2005 while attempting to vet the very 1983 Kennedy document that Kengor and Levin discussed on TV. Also ironically, in light of Kengor’s downgrading of Hopkins to “probably” just a clueless dupe, he ends his appreciation with a testament to the care and caution Romerstein applied to the sensitive work of trying to identify America’s covert enemies within.

Given Romerstein’s professional assessment that Hopkins was a Soviet agent of influence, this section of Kengor’s appreciation is worth quoting.

Romerstein, Kengor wrote, “was no bomb-thrower. He was the epitome of responsible, informed anti-communism. He was careful about drawing the necessary lines of distinction between a liberal, a liberal anti-communist, a genuine progressive, a closet communist masquerading as a ‘progressive,’ a socialist, a small ‘c’ or big ‘C’ communist/Communist, a Party member or non-Party member, and so forth.

“He never wanted to falsely accuse anyone. I doubt his detractors on the left will pause to credit him for such prudence. For many on the left, every anti-communist rightly concerned with Soviet agents or agents of influence was merely another burgeoning Joe McCarthy.”

(It pains me, but I will have to let Kengor’s gratuitous “Joe McCarthy” dig pass.)

Kengor continued: “Herb Romerstein was anything but. And he wanted those of us who follow in his footsteps, or who are concerned about communism still—and about truth above all—to be likewise as careful and thoughtful. Perhaps our best tribute to Herb’s memory would be to do our best to expose what he exposed and remind Americans and the world of what he reminded.”

Ek stem saam. So here goes. Romerstein responsibly, carefully, and thoughtfully concluded that Hopkins, aka FDR’s “co-president,” was both a spy and an agent of influence.

Diana West is an award-winning journalist and the author of two books: “American Betrayal: The Secret Assault on Our Nation’s Character” and “The Death of the Grown-Up: How America’s Arrested Development Is Bringing Down Western Civilization.”

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.



Kommentaar:

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