'N Konserwatiewe benadering tot die industriële revolusie

'N Konserwatiewe benadering tot die industriële revolusie


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Laissez faire (uit die Franse, wat beteken om alleen te laat of om toe te laat) is 'n ekonomiese en politieke leerstelling wat beweer dat ekonomieë die doeltreffendste funksioneer as hulle nie deur die regering se regulasies belemmer word nie. Laissez faire-advokate bevoordeel individuele eiebelang en mededinging, en is gekant teen die belasting en regulering van handel.

  • Die Fisiokrate, vroeë ekonome in die middel van die 18de eeu, Frankryk, wat gereageer het op die benarde situasie van die handelaarsklas wat onder die talle voorskrifte van die Franse Mercantilisme gepla het. Hulle het betoog teen navigasiewette, tariewe, besigheidsbelasting en spesiale monopolieë.
  • Adam Smith, vader van die klassieke ekonomie, onderhou in Rykdom van nasies (1776) dat Brittanje se doel die bevordering van die welsyn van individue moes gewees het, eerder as om te fokus op nasionale mag en aansien. Vry funksionerende ekonomieë kon voordele vir alle vlakke van die samelewing inhou.
  • John Stuart Mill die sake uiteengesit vir en teen die inmenging van die regering in die ekonomie Beginsels van politieke ekonomie (1848).

Laissez faire se ekonomiese beginsels is nie altyd entoesiasties in die Verenigde State aanvaar nie:

  • Alexander Hamilton het hulde gebring aan vryheid van ekonomiese beperkings, maar was 'n effektiewe voorstander van proteksionisme om die land se "baba -nywerhede" te koester.
  • Antebellum Southern planters het jare lank probeer om die swaar hand van die federale regering te verwyder van hul pogings om hul produkte uit te voer. Hoë tariewe in die Verenigde State beteken dikwels vergeldingspligte elders.
  • Laissez faire bereik sy hoogtepunt in die 1870's tydens die industrialisasie, aangesien Amerikaanse fabrieke met 'n vrye hand bedryf is. 'N Teenstrydigheid het egter ontstaan ​​namate mededingende ondernemings begin saamsmelt het, wat 'n krimping van mededinging tot gevolg gehad het.
  • Tydens die administrasies van Theodore Roosevelt en Woodrow Wilson het die openbare mening verskuif om antitrustwetgewing te ondersteun en die misbruik van onbeperkte sake te bekamp - kinderarbeid, lang fabrieksure en onveilige werksomstandighede.
  • Laissez faire -houdings het tydens die bloeityd van die 20ste eeu 'n soortgelyke terugkeer beleef, maar die depressie van die dertigerjare het die New Deal tot gevolg gehad en die regering se ingryping in die ekonomie teruggekeer.

Die filosofie van nie -betrokkenheid by die regering word nie altyd simmetries toegepas nie, soos Franklin D. Roosevelt in sy toespraak aan die Commonwealth Club van San Francisco in 1932 uitgewys het:

Dieselfde man wat vir u sê dat hy nie wil hê dat die regering in die sakedrag moet inmeng nie-en hy bedoel dit, en het baie goeie redes om te sê-is die eerste om na Washington te gaan en die regering 'n verbode tarief te vra sy produk. As dinge net erg genoeg word-soos twee jaar gelede-sal hy ewe vinnig na die Amerikaanse regering gaan en 'n lening vra; en die Reconstruction Finance Corporation is die gevolg daarvan. Elke groep het beskerming van die regering gevra vir sy eie besondere belang, sonder om te besef dat die funksie van die regering moet wees om geen klein groepie te bevoordeel ten koste van sy plig om die regte van persoonlike vryheid en privaatbesit van al sy burgers te beskerm.

Die Industriële Revolusie

Die Renaissance en sy ideale het na Engeland gekom, destyds 'n agterwaterkrag, tydens die bewind van die Tudors (1485–1603).

'n Anglo-Italiaanse lid van koningin Elizabeth se hof.

Die opkoms van Britse mag sou die derde groot vooruitgang in die bestuur, die Industriële Revolusie, veroorsaak. Namate die mag van die Britse Ryk gegroei het, het handelsgeleenthede ook toegeneem. In die 18de eeu het verskeie internasionale korporasies ontstaan, soos die Hudson's Bay Company

wat wêreldwyd sake gedoen het. Die Hudson's Bay Company het bonthandel in Kanada georkestreer waar pels vervaardig is en daarna na Engeland gestuur is vir handel in enige deel van die wêreld.

Hierdie verdere ontwikkeling van die handel het gelei tot die vestiging van die mark as 'n dominante manier om die uitruil van goedere te organiseer. Die mark sou die optrede en aktiwiteite van verskillende deelnemers koördineer, sodat hulpbronne na hul doeltreffendste gebruike kon vloei. Een van die belangrikste intellektuele leiers van hierdie tydperk was die ekonoom en morele filosoof Adam Smith.

Smith het die idee van spesialisasie en koördinasie binne korporasies voorgestel as 'n bron van ekonomiese groei. Spesialisering en arbeidsverdeling was Smith se belangrikste bydraes tot die bestuur se denke. Die arbeidsverdeling het beteken dat 'n werker gespesialiseer het in die uitvoering van een taak wat deel uitmaak van 'n groter reeks take, aan die einde waarvan 'n produk geproduseer sou word. Die idee van spesialisering van arbeid het verskeie belangrike uitkomste gehad. Eerstens het spesialisering die koste van goedere drasties verlaag. Tweedens het dit die behoefte aan opleiding drasties verminder. In plaas daarvan om elke aspek van 'n taak te leer, moes werkers 'n gedeelte daarvan leer. Derdens het die behoefte om al hierdie verskillende take te koördineer, 'n groter klem op bestuur vereis.

'N Ander belangrike deel van die Industriële Revolusie was die ontwikkeling van die stoomenjin, wat 'n groot rol gespeel het in die verbetering van die vervoer van goedere en grondstowwe. Die stoommasjien het produksie- en vervoerkoste verlaag, waardeur pryse verlaag is en produkte in staat was om verre markte te bereik.

Met die Industriële Revolusie het die moderne onderneming ontstaan, waarin werk, gewoonlik in die fabriek, deur spesialiste gespesialiseer en gekoördineer is.

Voor die Industriële Revolusie het goedere en dienste nie standaardisering gehad nie en is dit in klein hoeveelhede tuis vervaardig.

In die Industriële Revolusie is die werk verskuif van familieproduksie na tuisproduksie na fabrieksproduksie. Hierdie fabrieke kan honderde en selfs duisende werkers in diens neem wat massastandaarde gestandaardiseerde goedere goedkoper vervaardig as wat dit in huise vervaardig kon word.

Fabriekgroottes wissel van dele van stede en dorpe tot hele stede, soos Lowell, Massachusetts, wat hoofsaaklik uit tekstielmeulens bestaan ​​het. Namate die Industriële Revolusie vorder, het klein fabrieke in groter omskep. In 1849 het Harvester in Chicago 123 werkers in diens gehad en was dit die grootste fabriek in die Verenigde State. Die McCormick-fabriek het teen die middel van die 1850's 250 werkers gehad wat 2 500 maaiers per jaar gemaak het. Na die Groot Chicago -brand het McCormick 'n nuwe aanleg met 800 werkers en verkope ver bo $ 1 miljoen gebou. In 1913 het Henry Ford se fabriek in Dearborn tot 12 000 werkers in diens gehad.

Die Industriële Revolusie het van Engeland oor die hele wêreld verskuif en uiteindelik die weg na die Verenigde State gevind. Die Verenigde State het vanaf die 1820's tot die 1860's verskeie noemenswaardige industriële revolusies begin sien. Die transportrevolusie het die bou van kanale en later spoorweë wat die verskillende dele van die kontinent verbind het, ingesluit. Die opkoms van 'n telegraafstelsel het vinniger kommunikasie tussen verskillende dele van die Verenigde State moontlik gemaak. Voorheen sou dit weke neem om inligting van New York na Boston met die telegraaf te kry; dit het minute geneem.

Na die tydperk van die Amerikaanse burgeroorlog, wat in 1865 geëindig het, was die samelewing getuie van die opkoms van reusagtige korporasies wat oor die vasteland strek en fabrieke wat soos klein stede was.

In die fabriek was dit egter vir werkers moontlik om werk te vermy of selfs masjiene te vernietig as hulle nie van die bestuur se idees hou nie. Elke werker het die werk op 'n ander manier gedoen, dit lyk asof werkers gekies is sonder om te kyk of hulle geskik is vir 'n spesifieke taak, die bestuur blykbaar grillig te wees en die standaardisering van toerusting was min.

Omdat produksiehoeveelheid vir die bestuur en die werker onbekend was, het die bestuur nie verduidelik hoe hulle bepaal wat geproduseer moet word nie. Werkers het geglo dat die bestuur bepaal wat op 'n lukrake manier geproduseer moet word.

  1. Waarom was Adam Smith se spesialisering van arbeid so belangrik?
  2. Wat was die ekonomiese en bestuursnalatenskap van die Industriële Revolusie? Wat was die uitdagings?

Die Industriële Revolusie was 'n produk van 'n kombinasie van faktore, waaronder die verspreiding van leer uit die Italiaanse Renaissance, die verbetering van vervoer, die markrevolusie en tegnologie. Boonop het geleerdes soos Adam Smith ondersteuning gebied vir die idees van arbeidsverdeling, spesialisasie en koördinasie binne 'n korporasie, wat die ontwikkeling van fabrieke moontlik gemaak het. Hierdie ekonomiese verskuiwing het die behoefte aan bestuurders veroorsaak.


1ste Industriële Revolusie

Die Eerste Industriële Revolusie begin in die 18de eeu deur die gebruik van Stoom krag en meganisering van produksie. Wat voorheen drade op eenvoudige wiele geproduseer het, het die gemeganiseerde weergawe behaal agt keer die volume in dieselfde tyd. Stoom krag was reeds bekend. Die gebruik daarvan vir industriële doeleindes was die grootste deurbraak vir menslike produktiwiteit te verhoog. In plaas daarvan om weefstowwe wat deur spiere aangedryf word, te weef, stoom enjins gebruik kan word vir krag. Ontwikkelings soos die stoomskip of (ongeveer 100 jaar later) die stoom aangedrewe lokomotief verdere massiewe veranderinge teweeggebring omdat mense en goedere in minder ure groot afstande kon beweeg.


'N Konserwatiewe benadering tot die industriële revolusie - geskiedenis

Die evolusie van die bewaringsbeweging, 1850 �,
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/amrvhtml/conshome.html
Geskep en onderhou deur die Library of Congress.
Beoordeel Mei-Junie 2009.

Hierdie verbasend ryk webgebaseerde argief bevat enkele sentrale kwessies wat die Amerikaanse bewaringsbeweging van die middel van die negentiende tot die vroeë twintigste eeu gevorm het. Net soos die onderwerp daarvan, gebruik die webwerf ook uitgebreide rekords by die Library of Congress (LOC), wat lesers koppel aan boeke en pamflette, 140 federale statute en kongresbesluite, 34 bykomende wetgewende dokumente, uittreksels uit die Congressional Globe en die Congressional Record, 360 presidensiële proklamasies, 170 afdrukke en foto's, 2 historiese manuskripte en 2 rolprente. die federale regering se verbintenis tot bewaring en wat die webwerfredakteur Jurretta Jordan Heckscher noem die 'generatiewe kulturele milieu' wat die natuurbewaarder gekoester het.

Eerstens 'n paar voorbehoude: in sy hele reeks bevat The Evolution of the Conservation Movement nie sleuteldata in die LOC -argiewe nie. Soos Heckscher opgemerk het, ontbreek die uitvoerende bevele van president Theodore Roosevelt wat soveel nasionale woude, parke en toevlugsoord gevestig het. Relevante koerantberigte en periodieke literatuur, sowel as die biblioteek se uiteensetting van politieke spotprente oor bewaring, is ook afwesig. ” Daar is ook 'n paar tegniese probleme. Alhoewel die webwerf relatief maklik is om te navigeer, is dit nie altyd maklik om te lees nie, met klein teks oor die hele breedte van die skerm, maar gebruikers sal hul oë inspan om die woorde te sien en hul betekenis te absorbeer. Die individuele bladuitlegte van die werf is nie so gebruikersvriendelik of grafies oortuigend as wat hedendaagse webontwerpe kan (en behoort) te wees nie.

Tog is die webwerf 'n winkel van oorvloed en sal dit die studente, onderwysers en geleerdes wat dit ondersoek, baie beloon, op soek na dokumentêre bewyse waarom Amerikaners uit alle vlakke van die samelewing te midde van die Industriële Revolusie het begin argumenteer vir die bewaring van natuurlike hulpbronne, die behoud van natuurskoon en die beskerming van wildlewe.

Een van die belangrike figure is George Perkins Marsh, wie se adres in 1847 aan die Rutland County (Vermont) Agriculture Society die eerste teks is. Daarin het Marsh 'n sentrale idee neergelê, wat twintig jaar later sy mens en natuur sou animeer (1864) en dikwels as die intellektuele basis vir natuurbewaring beskou word: 'n Sosiale mens vergoed die aarde alles wat hy van haar maai. boesem. ”

Die kweek van die meer harmonieuse verhouding met die natuur wat Marsh as noodsaaklik geag het, was 'n magdom skilders en litograwe wat oor die hele vasteland gewaai het om die majestueuse vorm en morele invoer van die land uit te beeld. Ander bydraers was skrywers soos Mabel Osgood Wright (Citizen Bird, 1897), Mary Austin (Land of Little Rain, 1903) en John Muir (“ Laat almal help om die beroemde Hetch Hetchy -vallei te red, ” 1909). Die wisselwerking tussen hierdie kulturele agente en argumente (en daaropvolgende politieke aktivisme) word weerspieël in die lang reeks wetgewende inisiatiewe en presidensiële proklamasies, wat uitloop op die inwerkingtreding van die 1920 Federal Water Power Act, die laaste dokument van die webwerf. Bewaring, onthul hierdie fassinerende bewaarplek, was 'n dryfveer agter die skepping van die moderne, regulerende nasiestaat.


4.8/5.0 op Apple Podcasts

'Dit is 'n fantastiese podcast vir geskiedenis om meer te wete te kom oor die tydperk van die industriële revolusie, en baie van die fassinerende historiese onderwerpe rondom dit sowel as die mense, plekke, uitvindings en gemeenskappe. Die gasheer is fantasties, maklik om na te luister en hierdie podcast is goed nagevors en 'n goeie bron om te leer oor 'n belangrike tydperk. ”

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'n puik reeks!

'Hierdie podcast volg 'n onderwerpgerigte benadering tot 'n eindeloos gedetailleerde en fassinerende tydperk in die geskiedenis. Die oorsake en gevolge van die Industriële Revolusie het in baie groot mate die daaglikse werklikheid bepaal wat ons vandag leef. Hierdie kragte word breedvoerig ondersoek, asook die ontwikkelende ideologieë wat konflik in die meer onlangse geskiedenis gevorm het. 'N Fantastiese podcast wat ek in die toekoms sal sien. ”

★★★★★

Die beste geskiedenis podcast!

'Ek en my kêrel is mal oor hierdie podcast. Ons luister na 'n paar episodes op 'n slag op lang ritte, en ons vermaak dit nooit en laat ons nie weet nie. Goed nagevors en goed gepraat, ons kan hierdie podcast nie genoeg aanbeveel vir al ons vriende nie ... "


Hoe het die industriële revolusie onderwys beïnvloed?

Die Industriële Revolusie het verskeie belangrike veranderings op die onderwysgebied aangebring deur onderwys toeganklik te maak vir kinders van alle sosio -ekonomiese agtergronde en wette op te stel wat onderwys 'n vereiste is. Voor die 1800's was die toeganklikheid van opvoeding vir kinders ongemaklik. Kinders wat uit welgestelde gesinne gebore is, het dikwels toegang tot opvoeding, terwyl kinders uit arm families nie.

Voor die Industriële Revolusie was onderwys nie gratis nie. Ryk gesinne kon dit bekostig om hul kinders skool toe te stuur vir 'n basiese opleiding, terwyl die onderwys wat arm kinders ontvang het, beperk was tot die tutoriale wat in Dameskole en kerkskole by Sondagdienste aangebied word. In 1833 het onderwys egter 'n helpende hand van die Britse regering gekry. Die regering het vir die eerste keer in die geskiedenis fondse bewillig om onderwys in skole te bevorder. Dit het geld aan liefdadigheidsorganisasies gegee om onderwys vir kinders van alle sosio -ekonomiese afdelings toeganklik te maak. In dieselfde jaar het die Britse regering wette ingestel wat vereis dat kinders wat in fabrieke werk, elke dag minstens twee uur lank skool moet gaan. In 1844 het die deur die regering gestigte Ragged Schools Union gefokus op die opvoeding van arm kinders, terwyl die Public Schools Act, wat in 1868 geskep is, hervorming aan die openbare skoolstelsel in Brittanje gebring het deur basiese vereistes vir opvoedkundige standaarde daar te stel.


'N Eeu van groot regering

Die Biden -agenda boots die lesse van ambisieuse voorgesitters in die verlede na en leer nie daarin nie.

Die epiese aard van die politieke stryd wat deur die ambisieuse Biden -agenda ontketen is, word miskien die beste verstaan ​​deur sy historiese konteks, soos beliggaam deur die rekords van vier presidente — Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, Lyndon Johnson en Ronald Reagan. Saam verpersoonlik hulle die groot Amerikaanse stryd van die afgelope 90 jaar skerpstes tussen diegene wat die steeds groter federale mag en ekonomiese herverdeling voorstaan, en diegene wat hulle teen hierdie liberale agenda weerstaan, aan die ander kant.

Wat uit hierdie historiese benadering duidelik word, is nie net hoe meedoënloos en uitgestrek die Amerikaanse linkses was om sy visie te versterk nie, maar ook hoeveel weerstand dit onder kiesers op kritieke tye deur die dekades ondervind het. Die Biden -magte beplan nou om die stryd eens en vir altyd te beëindig met 'n uiteindelike politieke verowering, so volledig en so geskei van konsensus dat kiesersweerstand jare of dekades lank betekenisloos sal word. Hulle wil hê Amerika moet sy laaste groot definisie -tydperk binnegaan en die soort demokratiese sosialisme wat die grootste deel van die afgelope agt dekades was, omhels.

Die politieke drama begin met FDR. Met die skep van sy New Deal in die dertigerjare het hy teruggekeer na die regeringsaktivisme van sy verre neef Theodore Roosevelt en die daaropvolgende presidentskap van Woodrow Wilson. Maar hierdie presidente, hoewel vurige regeringsaktiviste, het nooit die uitbreiding van die federale mag bereik wat Roosevelt na Amerika gebring het tydens 'n krisis wat slegs in die Amerikaanse geskiedenis oortref is deur die burgeroorlog nie. Die reële BBP per capita het met byna 'n derde gekrimp. Buitelandse handel het in duie gestort. Ongeveer 83 persent van die aandelemark se aandeelhouerswaarde het verdwyn. Werkloosheid het byna 25 persent getref. Gewaspryse het onder die bestaansvlakke vir die meeste boere gedaal. Baie het hul grond verloor aan banke wat self insolvensie ondervind het. Die sosiale samestelling van die land het begin ontrafel.

By die aanspreek van hierdie krisis het FDR die jaarlikse BBP -groeikoerse van ongeveer 7 persent gedurende sy eerste termyn voorgesit, terwyl die vervaardigingsproduksie met 50 persent toegeneem het en werkloosheid, hoewel dit steeds straf was, tot onder 17 persent gedaal het. Dit is nie verbasend dat die Amerikaanse volk met groot waardering en selfs eerbied gereageer het nie. Hulle aanvaar die magsbalansverskuiwing wat federale ingryping bevoordeel bo federale verdraagsaamheid, gemaklik.

Dit alles is weerspieël in Roosevelt se gewaagde wetgewende aktiwiteite: die National Industrial Recovery Act, die Agricultural Adjustment Act, die Glass-Steagall Act wat die Federal Deposit Insurance-administrasie tot stand bring en die finansiële aktiwiteite wat te riskant beskou word, beperk, die Public Works Administration, die Tennessee Valley Authority, landelike elektrifisering, die Securities and Exchange Act, Social Security en die Wagner Act wat nuwe rolle in kollektiewe bedinging tot stand bring. Dit was 'n versterkende versterking van die gevestigde federale mag deur die oprigting van 'n nuwe politieke klas regeringsamptenare (deel van die 'bestuursrevolusie' wat James Burnham kort daarna ondersoek het) en die opkoms van nuwe nasionale kiesafdelingsgroepe wat aan Roosevelt se party toegewy en intens toegewyd was daaraan.

Die kiesers het FDR beloon met 'n asemrowende triomf vir herverkiesing. Toe die stof bedaar, het sy Demokratiese Party 75 setels in die Senaat beheer tot slegs 21 vir die opposisie, terwyl die Huis demokraties was tot 331 setels tot slegs 89 vir Republikeine. Dit was 'n kiesmandaat wat byna ongeëwenaard was in die Amerikaanse politieke geskiedenis. Toe verkwis Roosevelt die mandaat met sy poging om die Hooggeregshof te “pak” en sy magsbalans te verander ten gunste van sy pogings om sy New Deal te beskerm en uit te brei.

Die afgelope tyd is daar baie geskryf in die nasleep van die Demokratiese oproepe om 'n soortgelyke aksie om hul party vandag te bevoordeel — oor FDR se vernederende versuim om goedkeuring van die kongres vir sy inisiatief te kry, duidelik 'n onsmaaklike magsgreep. Die impak op sy planne vir die uitbreiding van New Deal word minder opgemerk: die magsgreep en die politieke kapitaal wat FDR daaraan bestee het, tesame met 'n terugslag in die resessie van 1937, het die New Deal in wese bevries. Geen uitbreiding meer nie. In die middeltermynverkiesings van 1938 verloor die Demokrate 71 Huis setels en ses in die Senaat. Terwyl oorlog in Europa en Asië op hande is, het Roosevelt wyslik sy aandag op buitelandse sake gevestig, en sy binnelandse planne is amper voltooi. Oor die New Deal -rewolusie het die kiesers in 1936 en daarna gesê: 'Dankie. Dit is vir eers genoeg. ”

Let daarop dat Roosevelt nie gekies het vir die nasionalisering van nywerhede wat sommige liberale tydens die depressie voorgestaan ​​het nie. Hy het eerder regulering gekies, selfs die banke wat in onheilspellende getalle misluk het, betrek toe hy by die Withuis ingaan. En toe hy sy groot stelsel vir sosiale sekerheid skep, het hy geweier om dit 'n oordragbetalingsprogram te maak, wat met inkomstebelasting betaal is, en eerder gekies vir 'n veiligheidsnetwerk, ondersteun met loonbelasting wat gekoppel is aan die voordele. Dit het liberale gerangskik, en steeds nog steeds,. Jill Lepore, wat haar tyd tussen Harvard en die Inwoner van New York (raai haar politieke sienings aan), het minagting vir hierdie benadering uitgespreek omdat dit haar jen nie genoegsaam bevredig vir die herverdeling van inkomste deur middel van belastingbeleid nie. Wat sy mis, maar wat die briljante politieke Roosevelt goed verstaan ​​het, is dat hy nooit die inwerkingtreding van sosiale sekerheid sou kon bereik as hy dit as 'n inisiatief vir herverdeling van inkomste beskou het nie. Die Amerikaanse volk sou nie daarvoor gegaan het nie.

In elk geval, dit was amper waar die land gestaan ​​het op die as van regeringsinmenging teenoor staatsbeperking toe die Republikeinse Eisenhower in 1953 president geword het, te midde van die oproepe van 'n paar topparty -figure dat hy die belangrikste dele van die New Deal sou afbreek. Eisenhower het nee gesê. Hy het besef dat FDR se handewerk te gewild en goed gevestig was vir so 'n inisiatief. Boonop sou dit die Amerikaanse volk beledig het. Kiesers hou nie daarvan om deur hul verkose amptenare idiote genoem te word oor hoe hulle stem nie. Maar Eisenhower wou ook nooit voortbou op die New Deal nie. Sy grootste huishoudelike inisiatief was die Interstate Highway System, 'n uiters voordelige infrastruktuurprogram wat die federale mag nie aansienlik verbeter het teenoor die state en die mense nie. 'N Nuwe ewewig in die magsbalansstryd met betrekking tot regeringsprerogatiewe is getref.

Totdat Lyndon Johnson, wat probeer het om die moord op Kennedy te benut om Amerika te transformeer deur regeringsuitbreiding. Dit het egter begin met die Kennedy-belastingverlagings, wat nie van die herverdelingstipe was wat Lepore begunstig het nie, maar eerder oor die algemeen verlagings wat nie die progressiewe aard van die belastingstelsel verhoog het nie. Die resultaat was heilsaam: die BBP -groei van 4,3 persent in die jaar van inwerkingtreding (1964) en 5 persent die volgende jaar. Vervolgens wend hy hom tot die agterstallige vereistes van burgerlike gelykheid met die belangrike burgerregtewet uit 1964. Toe kom die Wet op Gelyke Kans, 'n deel van sy visie op die "Great Society" om armoede te bekamp.

Skrywe akademikus Alan J. Lichtman en joernalis Ken DeCell saam: hierdie inisiatiewe was “die belangrikste inheemse beleidsinisiatief sedert die New Deal”. Toe kom groot inisiatiewe vir die tweede termyn, soos die Wet op Stemreg van 1965, Medicare en Medicaid, en 'n hele aantal direkte voordele vir behuising, opvoeding, voeding en dies meer. Volgens die Bill of Rights Institute het LBJ 87 wetsontwerpe aan die kongres voorgelê, en dit het 84 daarvan geslaag. Dit was 'n waansin van binnelandse wetgewing wat die federale regering meer en meer in die lewens van burgers ingevoeg het.

Afgesien van die burgerregte -wetgewing, wat die land as agterstallig en noodsaaklik aanvaar het, het die Johnson -erfenis uiteindelik die krag van die New Deal van FDR ontbreek. Wat armoede betref, het die werklikheid van verwarde verwagtinge bygedra tot rasse -onluste in groot industriële stede wat tientalle mense doodgemaak het en die Amerikaanse mense ontstel het. Volgens 'n studie het die regering tussen 1967 en 2014 $ 22 triljoen bestee aan armoedeprogramme, en tog bly die armoedekoers gedurende die tyd ongeveer 14 persent dieselfde (alhoewel dit aansienlik afgeneem het tussen 1950 en 1967, sonder dat 'n doelgerigte federale inisiatiewe). Johnson se besluit om groot bedrae aan binnelandse inisiatiewe te bestee terwyl hy ook sy duur Viëtnam -oorlog voer, het die ekonomie uiteindelik so erg gespanne dat dit 'n golf van ondraaglike inflasie ontketen het, dan iets erger wat 'stagflasie' genoem word, gelyktydig hoë inflasie en lae of negatiewe groei. Dit het uiteindelik gelei tot die presidentskap van Ronald Reagan.

Reagan het sy amp beklee te midde van haglike ekonomiese omstandighede. Die week van sy inhuldiging, Nuusweek van sy voorblad aangekondig: "The Economy in Crisis." Binne het die tydskrif gesê dat die nuwe president 'die gevaarlikste ekonomiese krisis sedert Franklin D. Roosevelt in die gesig staar'. Die getalle was sleg. Werkloosheid: 7,4 persent. BBP: in die vorige jaar met 1.5 persent gedaal. Eerste rentekoers: 21 persent in die handel. Inflasie: teen 13 persent. Die ekonoom Walter Heller het verklaar: 'Wat die groot depressie in die dertigerjare was, die groot inflasie in die tagtigerjare.'

Reagan betree die Withuis op die vleuel van 'n heeltemal onkonvensionele konsep vir daardie tyd: dit was 'n krisis wat deur die groot regering op die volk gebring is. Hy het gesê dat dit nie die oplossing vir die land se probleme kan bied nie was die probleem. Hy het ernstige beperkinge in die federale uitgawes gesoek en het 'n rukkie daarin geslaag voordat liberale teenstanders 'n teenmag teen verdere uitgawes besnoei. Hy het die New Deal bewustelik verbygesteek en het soveel van Johnson's Great Society gevolg as wat hy in die hande kon kry. Hy het belastingkoerse verlaag, wat onverbiddelik gestyg het en meer en meer mense in hoër belastingklasse verstrik het deur middel van inflasionêre 'hakkruip'. Hy omhels die Kennedy-konsep van verlaging oor die algemeen om herverdeling te vermy.

In die algemeen het dit alles gewerk. Toe Reagan eers die ernstige resessie oorskry wat die Fed -voorsitter, Paul Volcker, veroorsaak het om inflasie te onderdruk (geïnisieer met Reagan se seën), het hy die land deurlopend robuuste BBP -groeikoerse gegee, waaronder 6,2 persent in sy herverkiesingsveldtog van 1984 en 'n jaarlikse gemiddelde koers van 3,4 persent tydens sy tweede termyn. Die Amerikaanse bevolking het die Reagan -verhaal en sy beleid in groot getalle omhels, soos weerspieël in sy herverkiesingsoorwinning van 58,8 persent en sy oorwinnings van die kieskollege oral in Minnesota en die District of Columbia.

Reagan se uithouvermoë word weerspieël in die vroeë optrede van Bill Clinton, verkies tot president vier jaar nadat Reagan sy amp verlaat het (na George Middelburg se middelmatige prestasie op een termyn). Clinton verklaar by sy aanstelling dat hy van plan is om 'Reaganisme te herroep', en swig dus onder die fout wat Eisenhower vermy het: die kiesers beledig deur te vertel dat hul vorige verkiesingsbesluite 'n sekere onkunde weerspieël het. Teen 1994, nadat hy deur sy eerste twee jaar in sy amp geswem het en sy kop in die middeltermynverkiesings van daardie jaar aan hom oorhandig het, het hy die koers omgekeer en verklaar: "Die era van groot regering is verby." Hy het van daar af kredietwaardig bestuur en in die algemeen 'n stewige presidensiële vertoning gelewer.

Natuurlik is niks ooit verby in die politiek nie, maar die soort FDR-LBJ-aktivisme van die 1930's en 1960's was vir 'n geruime tyd nie meer te sien nie. Barack Obama het daarin geslaag om sy Wet op bekostigbare sorg te slaag en dit te handhaaf deur daaropvolgende pogings van die GOP om dit te darm of dood te maak. Maar Obama het misluk in sy poging om die energiekwessie aan te spreek deur aansienlike versterkings in die federale mag. Donald Trump het 'n goeie wedstryd in die antigovernment -trant gespreek, maar hy was nie in staat om volgehoue ​​optrede te neem nie.

En nou het ons Joe Biden. Omdat hy geen mandaat van die aard gehad het wat Roosevelt en Reagan opgedoen het nie en geen moeite gedoen het om sy inisiatiewe in 'n breë konteks van historiese noodsaaklikheid te plaas nie, wil hy bereik wat die Amerikaanse volk byna 'n eeu lank in die wiele gery het, en die federale regering tot stand bring as 'n ware leviathan, met onbetwiste tentakels wat in byna alle aspekte van die Amerikaanse lewe strek, aangevuur deur 'n herverdelingse etos wat FDR self voorspel het.

Die president stel ongeveer $ 6 triljoen nuwe uitgawes voor op 'n jaarlikse begroting van slegs ongeveer $ 4 triljoen. Onder die bestedingsdoelwitte is subsidies vir skoon energie, laaistasies vir elektroniese voertuie, gratis kindersorg, gratis kleuterskoolonderrig, gratis gemeenskapsonderrig, gratis gesins- en mediese verlof, en die onderskrywing van inkomste op 'n groot aantal maniere. wat geen werk benodig nie. Biden sal ook die regulerende staat in diens neem om banke te belemmer om in ou energieprojekte te belê en meer diversiteit te bewerkstellig. Soos die Wall Street Journal Biden "poog om die regering se kontant en die reëls wat daarmee gepaard gaan, te insinueer in al die belangrikste besluite in die gesinslewe." Hy wil 'Amerikaners laat staatmaak op die regering en die politieke klas vir alles wat hulle nie reeds verskaf nie'.

Let op die woorde “die politieke klas”. Dit is in wese 'n elitistiese agenda, wat die mag en invloed van die land se meritokratiese elite versterk, wat dit alles sal bestuur en steeds groter mag en rykdom daaruit sal put. En omdat Biden geen mandaat het van die soort wat die FDR- en Reagan-programme aangevuur het nie, besluit hy om fundamentele instellings aan te val op 'n manier wat ontwerp is en soos die Roosevelt se hofverpakkingskema om die speelveld te kantel ten gunste van die elite-agenda. Dit is die belangrikheid van die ontluikende inisiatiewe om die senaatfilibuster dood te maak, die hof te pak en staatskaping te gee aan Washington, DC en Puerto Rico.

Die geskiedenis van Amerika sedert Roosevelt se eerste termyn lewer min bewyse dat die Amerikaanse volk honger het na hierdie soort groot regeringsvergroting en indringendheid. Die geskiedenis dui inderdaad daarop dat die Amerikaanse volk nog altyd versigtig was om so ver te gaan. En niks in die land se onlangse politieke uitdrukking dui op iets wat 'n ernstige grond vir die Biden -visie nader nie. Die president is verkies tot leier van 'n nasie wat deur hartstogtelike onenigheid en ontwrigting gewikkel is, en bereik byna skrikwekkende intensiteit. Hy het 'n program op sy kiesafdeling losgelaat wat dit net erger kan maak.

Robert W. Vrolik, 'n jarelange joernalis en uitgewer van Washington, is die skrywer van vyf boeke oor die Amerikaanse geskiedenis, insluitend Waar hulle staan: die Amerikaanse presidente in die oë van kiesers en historici (Simon & Schuster).


Russiese industrialisering

Die Russiese revolusies van 1905 en 1917 was in baie opsigte 'n gevolg van Russiese industrialisering. Gedurende die 1800's was die ekonomie van Rusland steeds gefokus op landbou en natuurlike hulpbronne. 'N Hervormingsperiode aan die einde van die 1800's, gelei deur die beleid van Sergei Witte, het vinnige industrialisering in Rusland tot gevolg gehad. Met hierdie groei en transformasie het 'n paar merkbare probleme gekom.

The agricultural empire

Most Europeans were aware that the Russian Empire was rich in land, natural resources and economic opportunities. In the early 1800s, Russian leaders developed trading relationships with other European nations, exporting large amounts of grain and timber. Most of the revenue that flowed into the country lined the pockets of aristocrats and landowners and was not invested in industrialisation.

Industrial projects and incentives were often proposed in Russia – but they were rarely embraced, often because they threatened the financial interests of conservative landowners. Russia did have some heavy industry – mining, steel production and oil drilling – but its industrial sector was small compared to its rivals, Britain, France and Germany.

Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War (1853-56) exposed the empire’s underdevelopment and the urgent need for industrialisation. Russian factories could not produce weapons, munitions or machinery to match her enemies. There was very little technical innovation in Russia: most of its industrial technologies were imported from the West. The war exposed the empire’s railway system as woefully inadequate, with insufficient lines and rolling stock to move men or equipment in large amounts.

Alexander II’s reforms

The reforms embraced by Tsar Alexander II in the early 1860s were designed, in part, to stimulate changes in the Russian economy.

Emancipating the serfs (1861) was not just a social reform – it was also intended to release them from the land and the control of conservative land-owners. The Tsar and his advisors anticipated that many freed serfs would become a mobile labour force and relocate to areas where industrial workers were needed.

Emancipation was also intended to stimulate more efficient farming methods and higher agricultural productivity. One anticipated outcome was the formation of the kulaks, a wealthier peasant class. Die kulak would essentially be a ‘peasant capitalist. He would own larger tracts of land and more livestock or machinery he would hire landless peasants as labourers he would adopt more efficient farming techniques and sell his surplus grain for profit.

While the 1861 emancipation did release millions of peasants from their land, the strength of peasant communes prevented the widespread development of a kulak klas. Ultimately, the emancipation of 1861 failed to contribute much to Russia’s economic development.

The reforms of Sergei Witte

In the 1870s, Alexander II’s government initiated several large infrastructure projects, particularly the construction of railways. These programs were boosted with the emergence of Sergei Witte in the 1880s. A qualified mathematician, Witte had a track record of achievement, both in the tsarist bureaucracy and the private sector.

In 1889, Witte was placed in charge of the Russian railway system, where he oversaw the planning and construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway. By 1892, Witte was minister for transport, communication and finance.

Identifying a need for capital investment, Witte made it easier for foreigners to invest in Russian industrial ventures. Existing barriers were removed while foreign individuals and companies were offered incentives for investing in Russia’s industrial and manufacturing sectors.

Witte also undertook currency reform. In 1897, he moved the Russian rouble to the gold standard, strengthening and stabilising it and improving foreign exchange. He also borrowed to fund public works and infrastructure programs including new railways, telegraph lines and electrical plants.

The ‘Great Spurt’

By the late 1890s, Witte’s reforms had visibly transformed the Russian economy. Large amounts of foreign capital, chiefly from France and Britain, had funded new plants and factories in St Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev and other cities. By 1900, around half of Russia’s heavy industries were foreign-owned – but the Russian empire was the world’s fourth-largest producer of steel and its second-largest source of petroleum.

New railways allowed transport into distant parts of the empire, facilitating the construction and operation of factories, mines, dams and other projects. The Trans-Siberian Railway opened up the remote east, allowing investment in projects like the Lena River gold mines.

Russia’s industrial economy had progressed more in one decade than it had in the previous century. Its development was so rapid that the economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron later dubbed it “the great spurt”.

Problems in the cities

While it delivered great advances, Russian industrialisation also had unforeseen consequences. Some of these consequences would become problematic for the tsarist regime.

The construction of new factories drew thousands of landless peasants into the cities in search of work. Russia’s cities were not equipped for the rapid urban growth brought about by this new industrial boom. This breakneck urbanisation created social problems and led to the formation of a potentially revolutionary class: the industrial proletariat.

In the early 1800s, only two Russian cities (St Petersburg and Moscow) contained more than 100,000 residents. By 1910 there were twelve cities of this size. In the decade between 1890 and 1900, St Petersburg swelled by around 250,000 people.

Workers’ conditions

This growth was not matched by the construction of new housing, so industrial employers had to house workers in ramshackle dormitories and tenements.

Most Russian industrial workers lived in unhygienic and often freezing conditions. They ate meals of stale bread and buckwheat gruel (porridge) in crowded meal-houses. Things were even worse in the factories, where hours were long and the work was monotonous and dangerous.

Witte’s economic reforms and rapid Russian industrialisation had met, and in some cases exceeded national goals – but they gave rise to a new working class that was exploited, poorly treated, clustered together in large numbers and therefore susceptible to revolutionary ideas.

'N Historikus se siening:
“The state participated directly in the nation’s economy to an extent unequalled in any Western country. In 1899 the state bought almost two-thirds of all Russia’s metallurgical production. By the early 20th century it controlled some 70 per cent of the railways and owned vast tracts of land, numerous mines and oil fields, and extensive forests. The national budgets from 1903 to 1913 indicated that the government received more than 25 per cent of its income from various holdings. Russia’s economic progress in the eleven years of Witte’s tenure as minister of finance was, by every standard, remarkable. Railway trackage virtually doubled, coal output in southern Russia jumped from 183 million poods in 1890 to 671 million in 1900.”
Abraham Ascher, historian

1. For much of the 1800s, Russia was a comparatively backward economy in comparison to Western Europe. It remained dominated by agrarian production.

2. Russia’s Crimean War defeat created the impetus for reform. They began with the 1861 abolition of serfdom, a move designed to modernise Russia’s economy.

3. In the late 1800s, the main instigator of economic reform was Sergei Witte, who worked to attract foreign investment in Russian industries.

4. Witte’s changes triggered a marked growth in industrial production, the movement of workers into the cities and spending on infrastructure projects.

5. In economic terms, the policy reforms were successful and helped Russia belatedly industrialise – but they also created an industrial working class prone to grievances and revolutionary ideas.


The Invented History of 'The Factory Model of Education'

“What do I mean when I talk about transformational productivity reforms that can also boost student outcomes? Our K󈝸 system largely still adheres to the century-old, industrial-age factory model of education. A century ago, maybe it made sense to adopt seat-time requirements for graduation and pay teachers based on their educational credentials and seniority. Educators were right to fear the large class sizes that prevailed in many schools. But the factory model of education is the wrong model for the 21st century.” – US Secretary of Education Arne Duncan (2010)

One of the most common ways to criticize our current system of education is to suggest that it’s based on a “factory model.” An alternative condemnation: “industrial era.” The implication is the same: schools are woefully outmoded.

As edX CEO Anant Agarwal puts it, “It is pathetic that the education system has not changed in hundreds of years.” The Clayton Christensen Institute’s Michael Horn and Meg Evan argue something similar: “a factory model for schools no longer works.” “How to Break Free of Our 19th-Century Factory-Model Education System,” advises Joel Rose, the co-founder of the New Classrooms Innovation Partners. Education Next’s Joanne Jacobs points us “Beyond the Factory Model.” “The single best idea for reforming K󈝸 education,” writes Forbes contributor Steve Denning, ending the “factory model of management.” “There’s Nothing Especially Educational About Factory-Style Management,” according to the American Enterprise Institute’s Rick Hess.

I’d like to add: there’s nothing especially historical about these diagnoses either.

Blame the Prussians

The “factory model of education” is invoked as shorthand for the flaws in today’s schools – flaws that can be addressed by new technologies or by new policies, depending on who’s telling the story. The “factory model” is also shorthand for the history of public education itself – the development of and change in the school system (or – purportedly – the lack thereof).

Here’s one version of events offered by Khan Academy’s Sal Khan along with Forbes’ writer Michael Noer – “the history of education”:

Khan’s story bears many of the markers of the invented history of the “factory model of education” – buckets, assembly lines, age-based cohorts, whole class instruction, standardization, Prussia, Horace Mann, and a system that has not changed in 120 years.

There are several errors and omissions in Khan’s history. (In his defense, it’s only eleven and a half minutes long.) There were laws on the books in Colonial America, for example, demanding children be educated (although not that schools be established). There was free public education in the US too prior to Horace Mann’s introduction of the “Prussian model” – the so-called “charity schools.” There were other, competing models for arranging classrooms and instruction as well, notably the “monitorial system” (more on that below). Textbook companies were already thriving before Horace Mann or the Committee of Ten came along to decide what should be part of the curriculum. One of the side-effects of the efforts of Mann and others to create a public education system, unmentioned by Khan, was the establishment of “normal schools” where teachers were trained. Another was the requirement that, in order to demonstrate accountability, schools maintain records on attendance, salaries, and other expenditures. Despite Khan’s assertions about the triumph of standardization, control of public schools in the US have, unlike in Prussia, remained largely decentralized – in the hands of states and local districts rather than the federal government.

The standardization of public education into a “factory model” – hell, the whole history of education itself – was nowhere as smooth or coherent as Khan’s simple timeline would suggest. There were vast differences between public education in Mann’s home state of Massachusetts and in the rest of the country – in the South before and after the Civil War no doubt, as in the expanding West. And there have always been objections from multiple quarters, particularly from religious groups, to the shape that schooling has taken.

Arguments over what public education should look like and what purpose public education should serve – God, country, community, the economy, the self – are not new. These battles have persisted – frequently with handwringing about education’s ongoing failures – and as such, they have shaped and yes changed, what happens in schools.

The Industrial Era School

Sal Khan is hardly the only one who tells a story of “the factory of model of education” that posits the United States adopted Prussia’s school system in order to create a compliant populace. It’s a story cited by homeschoolers and by libertarians. It's a story featured in one of Sir Ken Robinson's TED Talks. It’s a story told by John Taylor Gatto in his 2009 book Weapons of Mass Instruction. It’s a story echoed by The New York Times’ David Brooks. Here he is in 2012: “The American education model…was actually copied from the 18th-century Prussian model designed to create docile subjects and factory workers.”

For what it’s worth, Prussia was not highly industrialized when Frederick the Great formalized its education system in the late 1700s. (Very few places in the world were back then.) Training future factory workers, docile or not, was not really the point.

Nevertheless industrialization is often touted as both the model and the rationale for the public education system past and present. And by extension, it’s part of a narrative that now contends that schools are no longer equipped to address the needs of a post-industrial world.

Perhaps the best known and most influential example of this argument comes from Alvin Toffler who decried the “Industrial Era School” in his 1970 book Future Shock:

Mass education was the ingenious machine constructed by industrialism to produce the kind of adults it needed. The problem was inordinately complex. How to pre-adapt children for a new world – a world of repetitive indoor toil, smoke, noise, machines, crowded living conditions, collective discipline, a world in which time was to be regulated not by the cycle of sun and moon, but by the factory whistle and the clock.


The solution was an educational system that, in its very structure, simulated this new world. This system did not emerge instantly. Even today it retains throw-back elements from pre-industrial society. Yet the whole idea of assembling masses of students (raw material) to be processed by teachers (workers) in a centrally located school (factory) was a stroke of industrial genius. The whole administrative hierarchy of education, as it grew up, followed the model of industrial bureaucracy. The very organization of knowledge into permanent disciplines was grounded on industrial assumptions. Children marched from place to place and sat in assigned stations. Bells rang to announce changes of time.


The inner life of the school thus became an anticipatory mirror, a perfect introduction to industrial society. The most criticized features of education today – the regimentation, lack of individualization, the rigid systems of seating, grouping, grading and marking, the authoritarian role of the teacher – are precisely those that made mass public education so effective an instrument of adaptation for its place and time.

Despite these accounts offered by Toffler, Brooks, Khan, Gatto, and others, the history of schools doesn’t map so neatly onto the history of factories (and visa versa). As education historian Sherman Dorn has argued, “it makes no sense to talk about either ‘the industrial era’ or the development of public school systems as a single, coherent phase of national history.”

If you think industrialization is the shift of large portions of working people to wage-labor, or the division of labor (away from master-craft production), then the early nineteenth century is your era of early industrialization, associated closely with extensive urbanization (in both towns and large cities) and such high-expectations transportation projects as the Erie Canal or the Cumberland Road project (as well as other more mundane and local transportation improvements). That is the era of tremendous experimentation in the forms of schools, from legacy one-room village schools in the hinterlands to giant monitorial schools in cities to academies and normal schools and colleges and the earliest high schools in various places. It is the era of charity schools in cities and the earliest (and incomplete) state subsidies to education, a period when many states had subsidies to what we would call private or parochial schools. It is also the start of the common-school reform era, the era when both workers and common-school reformers began to talk about schooling as a right attached to citizenship, and the era when primary schooling in the North became coeducational almost everywhere. It was an era of mass-produced textbooks. It was an era when rote learning was highly valued in school, despite arguments against the same. And, yes, the first compulsory-school law was passed before the Civil War… but it was not enforced.


Maybe you think industrialization is the development of railroads, monopolies, national general strikes, metastasizing metropolises, and mechanized production. Then you mean the second half of the nineteenth century, and that is the era where the structural dreams of common-school reformers largely came to pass with tuition-free schooling spreading in the North, the slow victory of high schools over academies, more (unenforced) compulsory school laws, a pan-Protestant flavor to schooling without official religious education, the initial development of a parallel Catholic parochial school system when Catholic leaders became convinced the public schools were hostile to their interests, the first research-oriented universities, a broad diversity of languages of instruction through the Midwest and south to Texas, the development of extensive age-graded self-contained elementary classrooms in urban school systems, the bureaucratization of many such systems, the (contentious) development of public schooling in the South, and the era when segregation laws were written at the tail end of the 19th century. It was also an era of mass-produced textbooks, and an era when rote learning was highly valued in school, despite arguments against the same.


Or maybe you think industrialization was assembly-line factories, private-worker unionization supported by federal law, the maturation of marketing techniques and the growth of a consumer economy, major economic crises, the introduction of cars and trucks, the mechanization of agriculture, and brutal, mechanized wars. Then you’re talking about the first half of the twentieth century. That was an era of rural-school consolidation forced by states, continued racial segregation, efforts to Americanize immigrant children and force them to speak English only in schools, the first legal successes in undermining segregation, the growth of (mostly small) high schools across the U.S. and tracking within those schools, the growth of standardized testing for local administrative purposes (including tracking), the evolution of normal schools into teachers colleges, and the slow separation of higher education into secondary and tertiary levels. It was the era when several regions of the country first experienced a majority of teenagers graduating from high school. It was also an era of mass-produced textbooks, and an era when rote learning was highly valued in school, despite arguments against the same. It was an era when compulsory school laws were finally enforced at selective ages, when child-labor opponents first failed and then succeeded at efforts to limit child labor by legislation… aided significantly by the Great Depression and the mechanization of agriculture, as teenagers found fewer opportunities for full-time work.

As Dorn notes, phrases like “the industrial model of education,” “the factory model of education,” and “the Prussian model of education” are used as a “rhetorical foil” in order make a particular political point – not so much to explain the history of education, as to try to shape its future.

What Do Factories Look Like?

It’s tempting to say that those who argue that today’s schools are fashioned on nineteenth century factories have never read much about the Industrial Revolution. (Frederick Engels’ The Condition of the Working-Class in England in 1844 is in the public domain and available via Project Gutenberg, for what it’s worth.) Schools might feel highly de-personalized institutions they might routinely demand compliance and frequently squelch creativity. But they don’t really look like and they really don’t work like factories.

In fact, the “Prussian model” superseded an education system that actually het gedoen look like a factory. The monitorial system and its variants the Lancaster, the Bell, and the Madras systems, involved schools that were housed in large warehouses – larger often than many of the nascent factories at the time – with hundreds of students in one massive classroom with one teacher. Students were grouped (30 or so together) not by age but by reading proficiency, with more advanced students – “monitors” – assigned to tutor and train the others.

Khan argues in his “History of Education” video that the Prussian model was the only way to provide a free public education, but as the widespread popularity of the monitorial system in the same period demonstrates, it was really just een manier. Due to labor costs alone, the monitorial system was actually far cheaper. (After all, the major innovation of the Prussian model was in levying a tax to fund compulsory schooling, not in establishing a method for instruction.)

In sy boek A Voyage to India (1820), James Cordiner explains the functioning of the Madras system following his visit to the Military Male Orphan Asylum in India where this model originated:

From the perpetual agency of this system, idleness cannot exist. On entering the school, you can discover no individual unemployed, no boy looking vacantly round him: the whole is a beautiful picture of the most animated industry, and resembles the various machinery of a cloth or thread manufactory, completely executing their different offices, and all set in motion by one active engine.

In other words, the monitorial system expressly operated like a factory. “Industry” here isn’t simply a reference to manufacturing or production “industry” is the opposite of “idleness.” To counter idleness, students must be taught to work – and the functioning of the classroom should be like a machine.

As Mike Caulfield points out, the monitorial system quite arguably provided a certain amount of “personalization” – at least as that word is often used today – insofar as students could move at their own pace, one of the shortcomings so often indentified in the “factory model of education.” Caulfield cites Andrew Bell’s guide to the monitorial system Mutual Tuition and Moral Discipline (1823):

The Madras System consists in conducting a school, by a single Master, THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF THE SCHOLARS THEMSELVES, by an uniform and almost insensibly progressive course of study, whereby the mind of the child is often exercised in anticipating and dictating for himself his successive lessons, by which the memory is improved, the understanding cultivated, and knowledge uniformly increased – a course in which reading and writing are carried on in the same act, with a law of classification by which every scholar finds his level, is happily, busily, and profitably employed every moment, is necessarily made perfectly acquainted with every lesson as he goes along, and without the use or the need of corporeal infliction, acquires habits of method, order, and good conduct, and is advanced in his learning, according to the full measure of his capacity.

But as Frederick John Gladman’s manual on education School Work (1886) suggests, despite its widespread adoption throughout the UK and US, the Lancaster system fell out of favor, in part because this “personalized” model of education did not stimulate sufficient intellectual curiosity in its students:

Failure occurred, as it always will, when masters were slaves to “the system,” when they were satisfied with mechanical arrangements and routine work or when they did not study their pupils, and get down to the Principles of Education.

According to Gladman, the Lancaster system was replaced by the Glasgow system, developed by David Stow, which emphasized the training of teachers so as to “cultivate the whole nature of the child, instead of the mere head – the affections and habits, as well as the intellect.” Training of teachers was necessary, Gladman contended, as “it is useless to have the machinery without the skilled workman, or the well-trained workman without the suitable premises.”

Similarly, the Prussian model was based on the training of teachers. As Victor Cousin wrote in his Report on the State of Education in Prussia (1837) – a report commissioned by the French government but, once translated into English, with great influence in the US:

Our principal aim, in each kind of instruction, is to induce the young men to think and judge for themselves. We are opposed to all mechanical study and servile transcripts. The masters of our primary schools must possess intelligence themselves, in order to be able to awaken it in their pupils otherwise, the state would doubtless prefer the less expensive schools of Bell and Lancaster.

Caulfield concludes, “That is those nasty sounding Prussians agreeing with the somewhat less nasty sounding Glasweegians that education must be reformed because it works too much like a factory. And the way to make it less like a factory is to bring in the expertise of a craftsman, in this case, the trained teachers that were the heart of the Mannian, Glasgow, and Prussian systems.”

The Coming [Industrial] Revolution in Education

Many education reformers today denounce the “factory model of education” with an appeal to new machinery and new practices that will supposedly modernize the system. That argument is now and has been for a century the rationale for education technology. As Sidney Pressey, one of the inventors of the earliest “teaching machines” wrote in 1932 predicting "The Coming Industrial Revolution in Education,"

Education is the one major activity in this country which is still in a crude handicraft stage. But the economic depression may here work beneficially, in that it may force the consideration of efficiency and the need for laborsaving devices in education. Education is a large-scale industry it should use quantity production methods. This does not mean, in any unfortunate sense, the mechanization of education. It does mean freeing the teacher from the drudgeries of her work so that she may do more real teaching, giving the pupil more adequate guidance in his learning. There may well be an “industrial revolution” in education. The ultimate results should be highly beneficial. Perhaps only by such means can universal education be made effective.

Pressey, much like Sal Khan and other education technologists today, believed that teaching machines could personalize and “revolutionize” education by allowing students to move at their own pace through the curriculum. The automation of the menial tasks of instruction would enable education to scale, Pressey – presaging MOOC proponents – asserted.

We tend to not see automation today as mechanization as much as algorithmization – the promise and potential in artificial intelligence and virtualization, as if this magically makes these new systems of standardization and control lighter and liberatory.

And so too we’ve invented a history of “the factory model of education” in order to justify an “upgrade” – to new software and hardware that will do much of the same thing schools have done for generations now, just (supposedly) more efficiently, with control moved out of the hands of labor (teachers) and into the hands of a new class of engineers, out of the realm of the government and into the realm of the market.


Was the Industrial Revolution created out of the Enlightenment period?

Marked change in the prosperity of many during the 17th century was born out of Britain’s control of the high seas and the trade routes. There were those who had a surplus of money in their pockets and a desire to differentiate themselves from others by means of possessions. Clothes, jewels, books, furniture became a means to ‘show off’ their wealth. Fashion was born and everyone, from the apprentice to the lord wanted to show that they had a sense of it. The desire for clothes made from fabrics other than home spun wool was creating an engine for industrial change, the textile industries were the early adopters of the changes that would roll out the Industrial Revolution, so yes in one very real sense, the exploring adventures of the Enlightenment period created a society in which demand for goods existed and once the ball was rolling it quickly gathered momentum.

New foods, drinks and tobacco replaced what had gone before and the people enjoyed them but they needed to be paid for and so changes in working patterns in society started to emerge. People worked longer hours, woman went out to work more than they had previously, there was more mobility in the work force and one factor often overlooked was the literacy of the English people. They were some of the most literate people in the world, they had laws and a government to keep order, was this the canvas readied for creating the Industrial Revolution?

They are still no answers and as many questions as ever, was the Industrial Revolution a domestic affair or was it the result of foreign trade. Did the money from slavery fuel the furnaces, could the Industrial Revolution indeed have happened without the slave trade?


Importance

Its importance lies in the creation of new machinery en tools to facilitate production, make it more abundant and cheaper. Die sosiaal changes were of great importance for the world and society, and we continue observing these changes to this day. Socio-economic change was of great importance because it consolidated the sosiaal division between those who produced and those who had the work force. Tegnologie was increased, machines were created which, although positive, also had many negative aspects. Industrial production en die growth of cities were increased.



Kommentaar:

  1. Wilfred

    Om saam te smelt. Ek stem saam met al die bogenoemde gesê.

  2. Lexann

    As jy meer gereeld na 'n eenvoudige wiskundige naslaanboek gekyk het, kon besprekings oor hierdie onderwerp heeltemal vermy word.

  3. Kaven

    Ek is jammer, maar ek dink jy is verkeerd. Ek kan dit bewys. E -pos my by PM, sal ons bespreek.

  4. Baylen

    Hierdie tema is eenvoudig weergaloos



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